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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION BEYOND THE  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
DAVID E. POZEN† 
The U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) allows any person to request any 
agency record for any reason. This model has been copied worldwide and celebrated as 
a structural necessity in a real democracy. Yet in practice, this Article argues, FOIA 
embodies a distinctively “reactionary” form of transparency. FOIA is reactionary in a 
straightforward, procedural sense in that disclosure responds to ad hoc demands for 
information. Partly because of this very feature, FOIA can also be seen as reactionary 
in a more substantive, political sense insofar as it saps regulatory capacity; distributes 
government goods in an inegalitarian fashion; and contributes to a culture of 
adversarialism and derision surrounding the domestic policy bureaucracy while 
insulating the far more secretive national security agencies, as well as corporations, from 
similar scrutiny. If this Article’s core claims are correct to any significant degree, then 
open government advocates in general, and progressives in particular, ought to rethink 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has stated that the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 
“defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.”2 Legislators, journalists, and 
watchdog groups routinely describe FOIA as “an indispensable tool in protecting 
the people’s right to know.”3 The fact that more than one hundred countries and 
 
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
2 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 
3 Open Government: Reinvigorating the Freedom of Information Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); see also, e.g., Patrick J. 
Carome & Thomas M. Susman, American Bar Association Symposium on FOIA 25th Anniversary, 9 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 223, 223 (1992) (“Proponents of the FOIA see [it] as an essential component of our 
democratic form of government.”); Critics Say New Rule Limits Access to Records, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/27/us/critics-say-new-rule-limits-access-to-records.html [https://
perma.cc/SLM9-TL8N] (describing FOIA as “indispensable to the democratic process”); Oh, the Places 
FOIA’ll Go—Freedom of Information Law Turns 46, OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG (June 26, 2012), 
http://www.openthegovernment.org/node/3493 [https://perma.cc/3D7A-XYLN] (describing FOIA as “a 
bedrock law of democracy”). On his first full day in office, President Obama hailed FOIA as “the 
most prominent expression of a profound national commitment to ensuring an open Government.” 
Freedom of Information Act: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
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all fifty states have enacted their own freedom of information laws, many of 
them based on the federal FOIA,4 would seem to support these claims. But the 
claims are false. A real democracy must have some mechanisms securely in place 
to shine light on the government’s actions. There is no need to have a freedom 
of information law on the U.S. model. 
On the contrary, the FOIA model has proven deficient in significant 
respects. Some of the causes are familiar. Notwithstanding FOIA’s ostensible 
“philosophy of full agency disclosure,”5 the Act is shot through with exemptions6 
and has never been funded at a level that would allow agencies to respond 
promptly to most requests.7 Notwithstanding FOIA’s explicit requirement of de 
novo judicial review,8 the courts affirm agency denial decisions at extraordinary 
rates.9 Attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs remain difficult to recover,10 
monetary damages are unavailable,11 and sanctions for improper withholding are 
virtually never applied.12 The law’s efficacy depends on a steady supply of 
tenacious requesters who know what to look for; in practice, corporate lawyers, 
information resellers, and other private rent-seekers use it most.13 
 
4 See DAVID KOHLER ET AL., MEDIA AND THE LAW 1018 (2d ed. 2014) (“Most current state 
open records laws closely resemble FOIA.”); ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT 
SECRECY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 15 (2006) (explaining that “after 1989 . . . countries began to 
emulate American practice [by adopting FOIA-style laws] at a remarkable pace”); see also HERBERT 
N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 44 (1999) (“[The U.S.] 
FOIA is recognized worldwide as trailblazing legislation.”). 
5 Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 38 (1965)). 
6 See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
7 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 114TH CONG., FOIA IS 
BROKEN: A REPORT 8-31 (Comm. Print 2016) [hereinafter FOIA IS BROKEN] (criticizing long backlogs 
and heavy use of exemptions in the Act’s administration); Russell L. Weaver, Free Speech, Transparency, and 
Democratic Government: An American Perspective, 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES GOUVERNEMENTS 
OUVERTS 165, 171-72 (2015) (Fr.) (summarizing FOIA’s best-known “shortcomings”); Charles J. 
Wichmann III, Note, Ridding FOIA of Those “Unanticipated Consequences”: Repaving a Necessary Road to 
Freedom, 47 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1223, 1253 (1998) (lamenting FOIA’s “woeful underfunding and understaffing” 
and noting that legislators, scholars, and agency heads “have all highlighted the need for more FOIA 
funding to ensure the effective operation of the statute”). 
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012). 
9 See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 679, 719 (2002) (finding a ninety percent affirmance rate in FOIA cases); see also Margaret B. 
Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, 54 B.C. L. REV. 185, 211 (2013) [hereinafter Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy] 
(cataloging a set of exceptional practices developed by judges in FOIA litigation “that collectively 
contribute to this super-deferential review”). 
10 See Laurence Tai, Fast Fixes for FOIA, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 455, 478-80 (2015). 
11 See Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 9, at 209. 
12 See Paul M. Winters, Note, Revitalizing the Sanctions Provision of the Freedom of Information 
Act Amendments of 1974, 84 GEO. L.J. 617, 618 (1996) (finding only one instance in which a court had 
invoked FOIA’s sanctions provision, which was added by Congress in 1974 “to spur the recalcitrant 
agencies”); see also 1 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 8:30 (3d ed. 
2000) (describing FOIA sanctions as “rarely invoked”). 
13 See infra subsection II.A.1. 
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Other grounds for concern are somewhat subtler and yet, I believe, even 
more fundamental. FOIA’s extension of access rights to “any person”14 
(including legal persons and foreigners15) makes it an entitlement program with 
no eligibility criteria. Rationing of benefits occurs de facto, however, through 
delays and denials that systematically advantage certain classes of requesters. 
FOIA’s reliance on requests is not only “contentious and time-consuming”16 but 
also establishes nondisclosure as the default norm in the absence of a formal 
claim for information and a corresponding “record.”17 FOIA’s focus on domestic 
policy agencies, meanwhile, ensures that the law is least relevant for the 
executive branch components that are most opaque. As FOIA was becoming an 
increasingly vaunted symbol of “the people’s right to know” over these past five 
decades, the amount of national security secret-keeping was only going up and 
up.18 Those agencies that do have large FOIA practices can expect to be diverted 
from their mission by tens of thousands of requests each year, along with a steady 
stream of lawsuits filed by ideologically hostile parties, charges of lackluster 
implementation, and episodic news stories that draw on the agencies’ FOIA 
disclosures to spotlight alleged incompetence and venality.19 
Compared to the citizen enforcement schemes used in areas such as 
environmental law or civil rights law, FOIA’s structure is substantially more 
decentralized and individualistic. It attenuates the link between the exercise 
of private right and vindication of the public good. The result may be the worst 
of both worlds: all the ad hockery and adversarialism of a “private attorney 
general” regime without much benefit, if any, in terms of efficient allocation 
of public resources or enhanced capacity to detect hidden violations of law. 
Add up these points, and one might find that FOIA ultimately serves to 
legitimate the lion’s share of government secrecy while delegitimating and 
debilitating government itself. 
Our landmark freedom of information legislation can thus be seen as 
reactionary on two interrelated levels. FOIA is reactionary in a straightforward, 
 
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
15  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE 
TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 40 (2009 ed.) [hereinafter DOJ FOIA GUIDE] (“A FOIA 
request may be made by ‘any person,’ a broad term that . . . includes individuals, partnerships, 
corporations, associations, or public or private organizations other than an agency.” (internal brackets 
and quotation marks omitted)); id. at 40 n.88 (noting that, under FOIA, “person” includes noncitizens). 
16 Michael Herz, Law Lags Behind: FOIA and Affirmative Disclosure of Information, 7 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 577, 585 (2009); see also id. (stating that FOIA is “inherently limited by 
the fact that the requester, by definition, does not know what the agency has and, therefore, does 
not know what to ask for”). 
17 Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 971 (2006) (“[FOIA] is not a freedom of ‘information’ law. It 
only reaches agency ‘records.’”). 
18 See infra subsection II.A.2. 
19 See infra Section II.B. 
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procedural sense insofar as disclosure is driven by requests for preexisting 
records. And partly for this very reason, FOIA is arguably reactionary in a more 
substantive, political sense insofar as it empowers opponents of regulation, 
distributes government goods in a regressive fashion, and contributes to a culture 
of contempt surrounding the domestic policy bureaucracy while insulating the 
national security state from similar scrutiny.20 For years now, commentators have 
been asking whether the First Amendment is serving neo-Lochnerian ends21 and 
whether the international transparency lobby is serving neoliberal ends.22 
Analogous questions can fruitfully be asked about FOIA and the global freedom 
of information (FOI) movement that it has spawned. 
Given FOIA’s many limitations and drawbacks, a forward-looking legislative 
approach must do more than refine the Act’s request-driven strategy: it must 
look beyond the FOIA strategy altogether. One alternative model for producing 
executive branch transparency involves affirmative disclosure requirements, 
which can be tailored in a variety of ways and enforced by agents such as 
inspectors general, ombudspersons, and auditors. Another model denies legally 
binding effect to government policies and decisions that are not publicized in 
a sufficiently timely manner. A third model employs continuous oversight by 
congressional bodies. A fourth model looks to whistleblowers and leakers to 
reveal worrisome activities and dissenting viewpoints. 
We have elements of each of these models in the United States. Slowly, 
incrementally, we have been developing them to compensate in part for the 
failures of FOIA. But none of these alternatives is as robust as it could be, and 
 
20 The “reactionary” label may strike some readers as polemical. I believe the label is warranted 
by the way it illuminates the link between the technical structure and the ideological valence of FOIA. 
As I will try to detail, FOIA’s practical effects are not politically neutral and tend to degrade certain 
progressive features of state and society, with progressivism understood to embrace ideals such as 
egalitarianism, expertise, and social improvement through government action. 
This characterization of FOIA as reactionary, it bears mention, differs from Albert Hirschman’s 
well-known use of the term. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: 
PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991). Unlike Hirschman, my focus is not on forms of rhetoric 
but on legal practices that exist within and exacerbate a particular political economy. That said, this 
Article’s rhetorical strategy might itself be read as reactionary in Hirschman’s sense, in that the Article 
questions the first-order benefits and emphasizes the second-order costs of a purportedly progressive 
measure. When the progressive justifications for a canonical policy no longer hold up, it seems to me 
that commentators may need to explore arguments that are formally reactionary (while also empirically 
and institutionally grounded) to make meaningful debate and reform possible again. 
21 See Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
1915, 1917-18 nn.4–8 (2016) (collecting sources that suggest the First Amendment has been “hijacked” 
by antistatist, economically libertarian interests). 
22 See Clare Birchall, Transparency, Interrupted: Secrets of the Left, THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y, 
Dec. 2011, at 60, 65 (reviewing critiques of transparency “for its complicity with neoliberalism” and 
an ethic of governance that privileges individualism and market functionality over other values); 
Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives in the Pursuit of a 
Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 476 n.123 (2012) (collecting sources on “transparency’s 
relationship to global neoliberalism”). 
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our affirmative disclosure norms are especially immature. To make good on the 
promise of FOIA over the next fifty years of the Act’s life,23 this Article 
submits, we will need to devote greater attention and resources to a range of 
information-forcing mechanisms. And to enable that shift, a shift away from 
the traditional FOIA model, we will need to let go of FOIA triumphalism—to 
stop seeing the law as the indispensable centerpiece of the open government 
universe, and to start seeing its reactionary elements more clearly. 
I. THE FOIA STRATEGY 
To get critical purchase on FOIA, it is important to recognize that the Act 
embodies one distinctive strategy among many available for promoting 
government openness and accountability. Without reviewing the development 
of FOIA in any detail, this Part will sketch the basic components of this 
strategy in contradistinction to other (nonmutually exclusive) strategies. The 
immediate goal is to clarify distinctive features of the FOIA system. The 
broader goal is to clarify the challenge of regulating government transparency 
by establishing some ideal types. 
A. FOIA as a Personal Enforcement Regime 
The engine of the FOIA system is the request for a government record. In 
contrast to the pre-FOIA Administrative Procedure Act (APA), FOIA allows 
“any person” to submit a request.24 In contrast to many state FOI laws, FOIA 
applies only to executive agencies and does not reach Congress, the courts, private 
entities, or the President’s inner circle.25 Following receipt of a written request, 
agencies must turn over “reasonably describe[d]” records26 promptly—within 
 
23 FOIA was signed into law on July 4, 1966, Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 
Stat. 250 (1966), and took effect one year later, Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 4, 81 Stat. 54, 56 (1967). This Article 
was originally drafted in preparation for a conference on FOIA’s fiftieth anniversary. See FOIA@50, 
COLUM. L. SCH. (June 13, 2016), http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2016/june
2016/FOIA-at-50 [https://perma.cc/3A3L-5TN6]. 
24 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012); see also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 828 n.205 (2009) (collecting cases affirming that 
“FOIA permits any person to request any type of information . . . without demonstrating any 
distinct interest in or particular need for the material”); Herz, supra note 16, at 582-83 (describing 
the “any person” standard as “a fundamental shift” from the original APA, “which gave wide 
discretion to agencies to withhold records if the requester was not ‘properly and directly concerned’” 
(quoting Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946))). 
25 Compare 1 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 4:5 (reviewing entities excluded from FOIA 
jurisdiction), with RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT 129 
(2012) (observing that most state FOI laws “apply to the legislature itself”). 
26 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). Records must be provided “in any form or format requested . . . if 
the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.” Id. § 552(a)(3)(B). 
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twenty working days absent “unusual circumstances”27—unless the records or 
portions thereof fall under one of nine enumerated exemptions.28 Adverse 
determinations are subject to administrative appeal and judicial review.29 The 
requester has no obligation to explain why she seeks records or to publicize them 
once obtained, and in practice the overwhelming share of materials obtained 
through FOIA have not been disseminated to the general public.30 Government 
transparency is thus framed as an individual right held by the requester alone. 
FOIA is sometimes described as a “citizen enforcement” or “private 
attorney general” regime.31 Like other such regimes, it relies on adversarial legal 
process, rather than inquisitorial or collaborative methods, to secure public 
values. Public-oriented inquiries by concerned citizens and their advocates, 
however, make up only a small fraction of the 700,000-plus FOIA requests 
submitted each year.32 Studies have consistently shown that the bulk of 
requests come from businesses seeking to further their own commercial 
interests by learning about competitors, litigation opponents, or the regulatory 
environment.33 Beyond businesses and trade groups, other significant classes 
of FOIA users include individuals seeking records related to their government 
 
27 Id. § 552(a)(6). 
28 Id. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The exemptions cover records that (1) are classified “in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy”; (2) are “related solely to the internal personnel rules and 
practices of an agency”; (3) are “specifically exempted from disclosure by [another] statute”; (4) are 
trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information; (5) are inter-agency or intra-
agency memoranda that would be privileged in ordinary litigation; (6) “would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” if disclosed; (7) are “compiled for law enforcement 
purposes” under certain circumstances; (8) are related to examinations of financial institutions; or 
(9) involve “geological or geophysical information” concerning wells. Id. 
29 See id. §§ 552(a)(4)(B), 552(a)(6)(A), 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 
30 Challenging this historic practice, the Obama Administration launched a pilot program in 
2015 to assess whether agencies should be required to post FOIA responses online. See infra notes 
239–242 and accompanying text (discussing the “release to one, release to all” initiative). 
31 See, e.g., “Preclusion” Doctrines Under the FOIA, FOIA UPDATE, Summer 1985, at 6, 
https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-foia-counselor-preclusion-doctrines-under-foia [https://per
ma.cc/AMF4-V69U] (noting that “FOIA plaintiffs are often considered as private ‘attorneys-general’”). 
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA 
REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 2 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ FY 2015 SUMMARY] (reporting 
713,168 FOIA requests received by the federal government in fiscal year 2015). 
33 See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1376-81 (2016) [hereinafter Kwoka, 
FOIA, Inc.] (summarizing prior studies and finding that “commercial requests represent the 
overwhelming majority of all requests received” at the largest FOIA offices for which complete data 
are available). The corporate skew in FOIA usage is longstanding. See Gregory L. Waples, Note, 
The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 958 (1974) 
(observing that the “benefits of the Act have inured predominantly to . . . corporation[s] seeking 
through disclosure an economic, competitive or legal advantage”). 
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benefits or immigration proceedings,34 as well as eccentrics and political 
opposition researchers who flood the system with repeated requests.35 
“Private attorney general” regimes typically identify some desired end, 
such as reducing pollution or discrimination, and empower citizens to bring 
lawsuits in service of that end.36 Yet in the case of FOIA, there is no specific, 
substantive policy that is being served. The filing of a FOIA request creates 
the legal norm—the obligation to disclose records responsive to that 
request—which then may be the basis of an enforcement action. Citizen suits 
regarding the environment or civil rights are meant to vindicate a set of highly 
reticulated environmental laws and civil rights laws. The only law that FOIA 
actions vindicate, at least in any direct sense, is the Act’s own disclosure 
requirement. The system of legal entitlements that FOIA creates is so broadly 
accessible, and potentially so divorced from public policy goals in any given 
instance, that it seems better characterized not as a private attorney general 
regime but rather as a personal enforcement regime. 
FOIA is strikingly decentralized not only on the requester side but also on the 
government side. Although the White House issues occasional implementation 
guidance and may consult with agencies on requests involving “White House 
equities,”37 the overall degree of FOIA presidentialization is low.38 The Act 
applies to more than one hundred federal agencies, many of which maintain one 
or more offices dedicated to processing FOIA requests.39 Chronically 
 
34 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1421 n.412 (discussing the use of FOIA by 
immigrants in removal proceedings); see also Frequent Filers: Businesses Make FOIA Their Business, 
SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS: READING ROOM (July 3, 2006), http://www.spj.org/rrr.asp?ref=31
&t=FOIA [https://perma.cc/PBY7-JKUK] [hereinafter Frequent Filers] (indicating that more than 
90 percent of the FOIA requests submitted to the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department 
of Health and Human Services, and the Social Security Administration “are also filed under the 
Privacy Act and come from individuals seeking personal records”). 
35 See PETER LEVINE, DEP’T OF DEF., CHIEF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT OFFICER 
REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 13 (2016) (complaining that some Defense Department 
components are “overwhelmed by one or two requesters who try to monopolize the system by filing 
a large number of requests”); Bruce E. Cain, Yes, American Government Is Too Open, 29 
GOVERNANCE 295, 296-97 (2016) (“Opposition researchers routinely use [FOIA] requests to gather 
information about opposing candidates.”); Michael Doyle, Missed Information: The Reporting Tool 
That Reporters Don’t Use, WASH. MONTHLY, May 2000, at 38, 38 (reporting that “[t]he National 
Security Agency has received more requests for information about UFOs than for any topic from 
reporters” and that “[t]he apparent 1998 champion for aggressively filing FOIA requests across 
multiple federal agencies was . . . a political operative seeking dirt on an opponent”). 
36 See generally Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 
(2013) (reviewing private enforcement mechanisms). 
37 See generally Mark J. Rozell & Daniel Z. Epstein, White House Equities: The New Executive 
Privilege, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 382 (2015) (chronicling and critiquing the rise of this practice). 
38 Cf. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 2252, 2383 (2001) 
(identifying a general trend toward the “presidentialization of administration”). 
39 For the full list of agencies, see Make a Request, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/report-make
request.html [https://perma.cc/H4MJ-K3VW] (last updated Feb. 2011). Within larger agencies, FOIA 
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underfunded and historically low-status,40 these offices together employ over 
4000 civil servants.41 Many thousands of other executive branch employees, 
as well as contractors, assist with FOIA matters on a part-time basis.42 The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) provides litigation support and coordinates 
interagency FOIA practice to a modest extent.43 The Office of Government 
Information Services (OGIS), created by statute in 2007 and located within 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA),44 now supplies 
an additional coordination mechanism along with mediation services.45 
OGIS, however, has minimal coercive authority46 and fewer than a dozen 
employees at this writing.47 Congress had considered creating an agency-wide 
“FOI Ombudsman” or “FOI Commission” when overhauling FOIA in 1974, 
but the reform was viewed as too “major” at the time.48 
Over the past quarter-century, the FOIA strategy has swept the globe. 
Spurred by an international right-to-know movement, the majority of the world’s 
 
processing is often spread across multiple components or program offices. See Edward A. Tomlinson, 
Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 133 (1984) (calling 
attention to “the highly decentralized nature of most agency FOIA operations”). 
40 See, e.g., Kathryn M. Braeman, Overview of FOIA Administration in Government, 34 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 111, 112 (1982) (stating that “in many cases [FOIA] work is assigned to the new kid on the block” 
and that, “[o]f course, there is a perception . . . that this is mere clerical work”). The Office of Personnel 
Management created a distinct job category for FOIA professionals in 2012, forty-six years after the 
statute’s enactment. See OPM Establishes a New Occupational Series for FOIA and Privacy Act Professionals, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFF. INFO. POL’Y (Apr. 23, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/opm-est
ablishes-new-occupational-series-foia-and-privacy-act-professionals [https://perma.cc/543A-RZBD]. 
41 DOJ FY 2015 SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 20. 
42 On the growing use of contract workers in FOIA administration, see Clara Hogan, The 
Outsourcing of Federal FOIA Services, NEWS MEDIA & L., Summer 2011, at 21. On the role of non-
FOIA personnel, see infra notes 156–162 and accompanying text. 
43 See generally Jefferey M. Sellers, Note, Public Enforcement of the Freedom of Information Act, 2 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 78, 84-119 (1983) (tracing the evolution of “public enforcement” mechanisms 
for FOIA and describing DOJ as “the closest to a ‘lead agency’ in administering the Act”). 
44 See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 10, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529 (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (2012)). 
45 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(3) (2012) (authorizing OGIS to “issue advisory opinions” and “to 
resolve disputes between persons making requests . . . and administrative agencies as a non-exclusive 
alternative to litigation”). 
46 See Mark Fenster, The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by Institutional 
Design, 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES GOUVERNEMENTS OUVERTS 275, 293 (2015) (Fr.) 
(“OGIS has almost no power, . . . as open government advocates frequently note and complain.”). 
47 See OGIS Contact Information, OFF. GOV’T INFO. SERVICES, https://ogis.archives.gov
/about-ogis/contact-information.htm [https://perma.cc/HW3Z-ALAQ] (listing eight OGIS staff as 
of February 18, 2017); see also David Cuillier, FOI Toolbox: Get Help from FOIA Ombudsman, QUILL, 
Oct. 2010, at 27 (criticizing OGIS’s small staff size). The recently enacted FOIA Improvement Act 
of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538, modestly strengthens OGIS’s role, among other reforms, 
but it authorizes no new resources for implementation. See OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement 
Act of 2016, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFF. OF INFO. POL’Y, https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-
foia-improvement-act-2016 [https://perma.cc/6344-2Y2L] (last updated Aug. 17, 2016). 
48 1 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 3:7. 
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countries, and virtually all of the wealthier countries, have adopted laws that 
replicate FOIA’s basic features, including the focus on official records; affordance 
of access rights to any individual or association; reliance on private requests to 
trigger disclosure obligations; independent or quasi-independent review of 
denial decisions; and exemptions for the protection of national security, public 
safety, personal privacy, commercial secrets, and internal deliberations.49 A 
“super-statute” at home,50 FOIA has become one of the United States’ leading 
legal exports abroad. 
Within the general FOIA framework, countless permutations are possible. 
Congress has revised FOIA numerous times,51 and scholars have suggested many 
additional reforms, from increased user fees52 to stronger prioritization of media 
requesters53 to the creation of a more powerful centralized oversight body 
comparable to Mexico’s Institute for Access to Information and Data 
Protection.54 Some of these reforms could have significant consequences. Yet, if 
it is important to avoid oversimplifying the FOIA strategy and to recognize the 
possibilities for internal variation, it is also important to avoid overlooking—and 
 
49 See DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INT’L, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE WORLD 
2006, at 20-26 (2006) (describing “[c]ommon [f]eatures of FOI laws”); Colin J. Bennett, Understanding 
Ripple Effects: The Cross-National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability, 10 
GOVERNANCE 213, 217 (1997) (noting “a remarkable degree of cross-national similarity between FOI 
laws,” with “differences center[ing] on relatively tangential issues”); James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” 
Versus “Access to Evil:” Should Disclosure Laws Consider Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 559, 562 (2002) (explaining that “most other nations [have] followed the template of the 
U.S. FOIA in allowing the unqualified term ‘any person[]’”); see also John M. Ackerman & Irma E. 
Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 99-115 
(2006) (cataloging and comparing national FOI laws); Greg Michener, FOI Laws Around the World, J. 
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2011, at 145, 146 (chronicling the “rapid diffusion” of FOI laws since 1990). Before 
it went global, the FOIA strategy had already swept the United States. See Roger A. Nowadzky, A 
Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB. L. 65, 65-66 (1996) (explaining that the 
enactment of FOIA prompted “each of the fifty states not already having an open records statute [to] 
adopt[] its own version”). In 2009, the world’s first FOI treaty of general subject matter, which tracks 
the U.S. FOIA on numerous dimensions, was adopted by the Council of Europe. Council of Europe 
Convention on Access to Official Documents, June 18, 2009, C.E.T.S. No. 205, https://rm.coe.int/Co
ERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680084826 [https:
//perma.cc/U8J6-QWAA]. 
50 David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 314 n.204 (2010). 
51 See Tai, supra note 10, at 456-57 (“In the aggregate, amendments to FOIA have been far more 
extensive than all the amendments to the other APA sections combined . . . .”). 
52 See, e.g., id. at 483-88. 
53 See, e.g., Erin C. Carroll, Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to 
Preference the Press, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 193. 
54 See, e.g., Julia Collins, Is Mexico Doing a Better Job with Access to Information and Transparency 
than the US?—At Least on the National Level, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE: UNREDACTED (Oct. 23, 2012), 
https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2012/10/23/is-mexico-doing-a-better-job-with-access-to-information-and
-transparency-than-the-us-at-least-on-the-national-level [https://perma.cc/FP6U-HJXS] (quoting Tom 
Blanton, Director of the National Security Archive, for the view that Mexico’s FOI law has become the 
“global Gold standard”). 
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naturalizing—the core elements of FOI laws that do not vary across jurisdictions. 
These elements, as this Article will argue, are neither politically neutral nor 
practically necessary and are far from an unalloyed good for public values. 
B. Other Regulatory Models 
An array of strategies for opening up government have emerged in recent 
decades and, in many jurisdictions, both complement and compete with the 
FOIA strategy. The critical question for legal designers, accordingly, is not 
whether any given FOI policy is working well (however this is defined and 
assessed). The critical question is whether the overall mix of openness policies 
is working well. To fixate on the performance of a FOI law alone is to risk 
missing the forest for the trees and committing a fallacy of composition.55 
At the U.S. federal level, at least four other legislative models for eliciting 
executive branch transparency warrant mention. Part IV returns to these models 
and asks how affirmative disclosure, in particular, might be strengthened in light 
of FOIA’s failings. For present purposes, the important thing to see is simply 
that these models exist—and that assessments of FOIA therefore must not be 
made in a vacuum, but rather in light of feasible alternative approaches that are 
already to some extent in place. 
1. Affirmative Disclosure 
Instead of delegating the authority to request records to an open-ended set 
of future parties, the legislature can instruct the executive to publicize certain 
categories of information in a certain manner and pursuant to a certain 
timeline. Such instructions are sometimes referred to as affirmative disclosure 
rules. Under a command-and-control version of this model, the legislature 
dictates at Time One which classes of information must be made public. “New 
governance”-style variants may allow for more fluid or deliberative 
assessments as to what must be revealed. 
FOIA itself has come to incorporate several affirmative disclosure 
requirements. Since the start, Congress has directed agencies to make publicly 
available certain items of general interest, including final opinions and orders, 
statements of policy, and interpretive rules.56 In the Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act Amendments of 1996 (E-FOIA), Congress went further and 
linked an ongoing affirmative disclosure obligation to the request-and-respond 
system, requiring that agencies post online records that have already been 
 
55 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the 
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2009) (defining the fallacy of composition as “the assumption 
that what is true of the members must also be true of the aggregate”). 
56 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012). 
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released to a requester and that are likely to be requested repeatedly in the 
future.57 These requirements, however, are said to be “widely ignored,”58 and 
affirmative disclosure is still seen by many as a “backwater, drab corner” of 
FOIA activity59—and of administrative law more broadly60—as compared to 
requests for documents. 
2. Conditioning Legal Effect on Prior Publication 
Another model of regulating executive branch transparency, and one that is 
relatively simple to operationalize, works by denying legal effect to policies and 
decisions that are not disclosed with sufficient notice to affected parties. 
Whereas affirmative disclosure requirements seek to anticipate and specify ex 
ante the set of agency behaviors that ought to be revealed, this model focuses 
on the ex post consequences of withholding. It does not similarly ensure a 
steady flow of information from the government to the public, but it reduces 
the burden on legislative drafters to delineate access rights and responsibilities. 
FOIA incorporates elements of this model, too. One section provides that 
no person may “be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter 
required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.”61 Another 
section prevents agencies from using a “final order, opinion, statement of policy, 
interpretation, or staff manual or instruction . . . against a party” if the item has 
not been published or otherwise made available to the party.62 Some have 
criticized this language for not going far enough—effectively exempting many 
national security directives and opinions63 and allowing agency regulations to 
 
57 Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 4, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2012)); 
see also Herz, supra note 16, at 586-91 (reviewing the 1996 reform); infra notes 304–329 and 
accompanying text (discussing subsequent affirmative disclosure developments). FOIA has always 
permitted, but not required, the proactive posting of other information. 
58 MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 514 (8th ed. 2011); see also id. (discussing a 
2007 study finding that “only 21 per cent of the agencies had complied with requirements that they 
post on their Web sites basic information such as opinions, orders, policy statements, and rules 
interpretations”); PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 25, at 384 (“[M]any a federal agency has failed to 
comply fully with E-FOIA requirements . . . .”); David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying 
the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1789 (2008) 
(“[A]gencies have by-and-large failed to comply with EFOIA’s affirmative disclosure mandate, and 
thus FOIA remains predominantly a requester-driven statute.” (citation omitted)). 
59 1 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 6:1. 
60 See, e.g., Herz, supra note 16, at 591-96 (cataloging recent laws that “promote the movement of 
[agency] information online,” but concluding that they “fail[] in fact to impose additional requirements 
for affirmative disclosure”). 
61 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2012). 
62 Id. § 552(a)(2). 
63 See, e.g., ELIZABETH GOITEIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE NEW ERA OF SECRET 
LAW 34 (2016) (“Most administrations have issued national security directives in the dozens if not 
hundreds, and the contents of most of these remained classified for years or decades (with some 
remaining secret to this day).”). 
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incorporate by reference privately developed standards that can be expensive to 
access.64 Their limitations notwithstanding, these provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552 
reflect a general congressional purpose, and a distinct instrumental strategy, to 
prompt “disclosure of documents which have the force and effect of law.”65 
3. Whistleblowing and Leaking 
Beyond agencies’ official records and representations, a legislature can seek to 
foster transparency through the unofficial disclosures of individual executive 
branch employees. “Whistleblower protection” statutes supply channels of 
communication through which these employees may reveal—typically to a 
specified executive body or congressional committee—potentially unlawful, 
wasteful, or otherwise troubling organizational behaviors without suffering certain 
adverse consequences. Beginning in earnest during the 1970s, Congress has 
enacted many whistleblower protection statutes that apply to federal government 
personnel,66 although their effectiveness has been called into question.67 
Outside the channels of communication designated by these laws, executive 
branch actors also divulge information that has not been officially approved for 
release in more or less clandestine exchanges with journalists and other 
audiences. Such “leaking” takes a wide variety of forms and, unlike 
whistleblowing, is at least as likely to be practiced by calculating political 
appointees as by concerned civil servants.68 Media outlets facilitate the flow of 
unauthorized and quasi-authorized disclosures by soliciting them, calling 
attention to their content, protecting their sources, and protesting their 
punishment. Even when the legislature declines to extend statutory protections 
 
64 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 497, 526 & passim (2013) (examining the widespread agency practice of incorporating by 
reference “voluntary consensus standards,” which are not made public and therefore “confer on private 
parties the power to place a monopoly price on access to knowledge of one’s legal obligations”). 
65 Tereshchuk v. Bureau of Prisons, 67 F. Supp. 3d 441, 456 (D.D.C. 2014). 
66 See JON O. SHIMABUKURO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43045, SURVEY OF 
FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER AND ANTI-RETALIATION LAWS passim (2013) (collecting statutes); 
see also Shawn Marie Boyne, Whistleblowing, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 425, 428 (2014) (“Outside the 
national security employment sector, the breadth and depth of whistleblower protections in the 
United States has grown exponentially since the Watergate era.”). 
67 See, e.g., Shelley L. Peffer et al., Whistle Where You Work? The Ineffectiveness of the Federal 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Promise of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 
2012, 35 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 70, 74-80 (2015) (finding, consistent with prior research, 
that the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 fails to protect most federal government employees 
and suggesting that the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 is unlikely to cure these 
defects). Whistleblower protections are especially limited in the area of national security. See David 
E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of 
Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 527 (2013) [hereinafter Pozen, Leaky Leviathan] (explaining that 
such laws “play a marginal role” in the national security context). 
68 See Pozen, Leaky Leviathan, supra note 67, at 528-34, 559-79 (describing leaking practices). 
1110 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1097 
to such disclosures (and thereby convert them into whistleblowing), individual 
legislators and their aides may stimulate leak culture by doing the same. 
4. Congressional Monitoring 
Finally, the classic model for securing executive branch transparency and 
accountability in the United States looks to Congress to investigate and 
respond to the executive’s activities. Such monitoring may occur in a “fire 
alarm” fashion, whereby third parties alert Congress to issues that demand 
attention. Or it may occur in a more continuous “police patrol” fashion, through 
committee hearings, reporting requirements, Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) audits, and other mechanisms that do not necessarily require a 
pulled alarm.69 Congress today has at its disposal a vast array of formal and 
informal oversight tools,70 some of which (for example, open hearings and 
unrestricted GAO reports) directly generate public commentary, and some of 
which (for example, closed hearings and agency site visits) do not. Once 
legislators have acquired information about the executive, the Constitution’s 
Speech or Debate Clause insulates them from civil or criminal liability for 
disclosures made in Congress.71 
The executive branch’s implementation of FOIA is itself monitored by 
Congress in a police patrol manner, assisted by the statutory requirement that 
each agency publish an annual report compiling aggregate statistics about its 
processing of requests.72 Of greater consequence, the use of FOIA by citizens, 
interest groups, and journalists contributes—along with leaking and 
whistleblowing—to fire alarm oversight by exposing agency behaviors that 
might not otherwise have piqued legislative interest.73 Justice Scalia missed this 
 
69 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (distinguishing between these two 
forms of oversight). 
70 See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 69-144 
(2006) (cataloging tools used by Congress to supervise the execution of its laws). 
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and 
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s 
Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 742-53 (2012) (analyzing the Speech or Debate Clause as a 
structural check on executive branch secrecy). 
72 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (2012). 
73 Although it does not reference FOIA specifically, McCubbins and Schwartz’s canonical 
article suggests that fire alarm oversight may be facilitated by laws that “afford citizens and interest 
groups access to information.” McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 69, at 166; see also Michael A. 
Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political “Transaction Cost” Analysis to Separation of Powers, 
47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (1997) (referring to FOIA as a “fire alarm rule[]”); Ben Worthy, 
Access to Information in the UK and India, 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES GOUVERNEMENTS 
OUVERTS 203, 220 (2015) (Fr.) (contending that FOI laws in India and the United Kingdom work “as 
a crowd-sourced ‘fire alarm’”). For an illustration of this phenomenon, see Paul Nussbaum, Specter 
Seeks Funds to Fix Bridges, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 22, 2009, at B1, which describes a request by 
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point in his famous critique of FOIA as “do-it-yourself oversight by the public 
and . . . the press,” which he contrasted with “institutionalized checks and 
balances.”74 FOIA enables both popular and legislative scrutiny; the former may 
be a goad to the latter. The extent to which FOIA advances congressional 
monitoring of the executive is open to question, however, and to my knowledge 
has never been studied. In subsection II.A.2 and Section III.B, I will consider 
the possibility that Justice Scalia may have been fundamentally correct in 
intimating that FOIA would tend to undermine, rather than fortify, 
congressional power. 
II. FOIA AND THE JANUS-FACED STATE 
The modern American state, according to historian Ira Katznelson, is 
Janus-faced.75 On the one side, facing inward, it looks highly constrained, 
process-oriented, clientelistic, and deferential to business interests. On the other 
side, facing outward, it looks highly efficacious, strong-willed, interventionist, 
and eager to do battle with enemies. The New Deal’s accommodation of southern 
racial and economic hierarchies bequeathed to us “both a ‘state of procedures,’ in 
which public institutions are too weak to check private economic power, and a 
‘crusading state,’ in which public institutions dole out overwhelming violence 
with little democratic oversight.”76 
FOIA, this Part will suggest, both reflects and reinforces this “strangely 
schizophrenic”77 equilibrium. “[V]iewed by many as one of the crown jewels 
of liberalism,”78 the Act has proven a regressive tool that serves corporate and 
“crusading” agendas while hobbling relatively visible efforts to regulate health, 
safety, the economy, the environment, and civil rights. FOIA does the least 
work where it is most needed and, at least from a normative standpoint that 
values effective and egalitarian governance above transparency per se, does too 
much work everywhere else. Other legislative strategies for securing executive 
branch information, moreover, do not suffer from the same pathologies. If these 
claims are correct to any significant degree, then open government advocates 
 
Senator Arlen Specter for stimulus funds to repair Amtrak bridges in the Philadelphia region 
following a Philadelphia Inquirer story about bridge conditions based on records obtained through 
FOIA. 
74 Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, 
at 14, 19. 
75 See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 
18-20, 484-86 (2013) (arguing that, “[m]uch like the Roman God Janus,” the post–New Deal American 
state “possessed two distinctive faces”—one of “procedural government” and the other “of a crusader”). 
76 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Last Lost Cause, JACOBIN, Spring 2013, at 96 (reviewing KATZNELSON, 
supra note 75). 
77 Id. 
78 John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental Contradiction, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 
1157, 1158 (1985). 
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ought to rethink their relationship to—and cool off their romance with—this 
landmark law. 
A. FOIA Winners 
In principle, FOIA is a “quintessential piece of participatory policy-making”79 
that affords equal access rights to all persons80 and advances a “philosophy of full 
agency disclosure.”81 In practice, FOIA establishes a working baseline of 
nondisclosure and systematically advantages certain private concerns as well as 
certain blocs within government. Some of these distributional implications may 
not have been consciously intended. But they were foreseeable from the start, 
and they have persisted over time and repeated themselves in other jurisdictions. 
They are a feature, not a bug, of the FOIA strategy. 
1. Commercial Requesters, Contractors, and Lawyers 
As students of FOIA have noted for decades, businesses are the Act’s 
principal patrons.82 Nearly four-fifths of the requests made in 2013 to agencies 
like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) were “commercial” in nature.83 Information resellers and 
institutional investors have become especially voracious requesters of late.84 
 
79 Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing 
Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1445 (2000); see also Memorandum from 
President William J. Clinton to Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/foia/whinitial.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQ2L-GBF7] (“[FOIA] is a vital 
part of the participatory system of government.”). 
80 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations 
Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 499 (1994) (“[A]ll FOIA requesters have an equal, and equally qualified, right 
to information . . . .”). 
81 Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 
38 (1965)); see also 112 CONG. REC. H13645 (daily ed. June 20, 1966) (remarks of Rep. John Moss) 
(“[FOIA] seeks to open to all citizens . . . the broadest range of information.”). 
82 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
83 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1388-401. A “commercial” request is defined by 
regulation as one that “furthers the commercial, trade or profit interests of the requester or person on 
whose behalf the request is made.” The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; Uniform 
Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,013 (Mar. 27, 1987). 
84 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1361 (detailing “a cottage industry of companies whose 
entire business model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell them at a profit”); see also 
Antonio Gargano et al., The Freedom of Information Act and the Race Towards Information Acquisition 
1 (Apr. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2517075 [https://perma.cc/5RGL-V
HST] (“[I]nstitutional investors routinely take advantage of FOIA to acquire information from over 
forty-two federal agencies.”); April Klein & Tao Li, Acquiring and Trading on Complex Information: 
How Hedge Funds Use the Freedom of Information Act 7 (Aug. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2653879 [https://perma.cc/U436-F8CL] (“[O]ur results provide evidence that 
hedge funds exploit the FOIA to receive value-relevant information that is not universally known to 
the market . . . .”). 
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FOIA, it is often said, was designed to help journalists and civic-minded citizens; 
the commercial complexion of its user base turned out to be “[o]ne of the greatest 
surprises about the FOIA in action.”85 While perhaps awkward, the conventional 
wisdom further holds, this surprising turn was addressed in amendments that 
allow commercial users to be charged higher fees86 and, in any case, does not 
detract from the Act’s virtues or require a fundamental reassessment of the FOIA 
model.87 This narrative overstates the degree to which corporate dominance was 
unexpected, and it understates the degree to which this phenomenon affects the 
balance of power between government and private industry. 
FOIA’s structure was always a natural fit for business interests. On the one 
hand, the administrative state generates and collects an enormous amount of 
information about regulated industries, and many businesses have an 
economic incentive to seek out agency records that may shed light on the 
activities of regulators, competitors, customers, or markets—especially when 
those records, once obtained, need not be shared with others. On the other 
hand, to make effective use of FOIA, requesters must have the agency-specific 
insight to know what to look for, a temporal horizon long enough to abide 
delays, and the wherewithal to negotiate with FOIA staff and to litigate 
denials under unfavorable conditions.88 Navigating the FOIA process takes 
not only motivation but also “time, money, and expertise.”89 Commercial 
enterprises, as well as certain nonprofit organizations dedicated to 
transparency or related values, are more likely than individuals and other 
groups to possess all of these attributes. Commercial requesters are also more 
likely to hoard whatever information they receive and thus to internalize its 
rewards.90 If private enforcement regimes disproportionately benefit savvier 
 
85 Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks 
of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 665 (1984). 
86 The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986; Uniform Freedom of Information Act 
Fee Schedule and Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,013, 10,017-19 (Mar. 27, 1987). 
87 See, e.g., RALPH NADER, THE RALPH NADER READER 50 (2000) (touting businesses’ 
“routine[]” use of FOIA as “an indication of how widespread the benefits of the Act have been”); Jane 
Kirtley, Freedom of Information Act—How Is It Working?, COMM. LAW., Fall 1996, at 7, 9 (attesting 
that “most in the news media do not support discrimination against the commercial requester”). 
88 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1376; Waples, supra note 33, at 958; see also PETER 
L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 
476 (11th ed. 2011) (“[T]he promise that attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs of substantially 
prevailing plaintiffs will be reimbursed . . . is not enough to make litigation by the general public 
attractive.”); supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (noting that FOIA plaintiffs cannot recover 
monetary damages and face exceptional procedural and substantive obstacles). 
89 Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1011, 1020 (2008). This is all the more true given that users who seek records from 
multiple agencies must submit separate requests to each agency’s FOIA office or offices. 
90 See Tai, supra note 10, at 485 (explaining that commercial requesters “are least likely to share 
the contents of any records they receive with the general public”). 
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and wealthier rights-holders (and the lawyers who cater to them) across a 
range of contexts,91 FOIA may be an acute case of a more general pattern. 
It therefore should not have come as a surprise that commercial requesters 
would loom so large—and indeed it did not come as a surprise to many. 
Leading administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis predicted in 1967, 
the year FOIA took effect, that the “overall conclusion is an easy one that the 
press . . . will benefit only slightly,” whereas “members of the bar and their 
clients will be the principal beneficiaries.”92 And in the period leading up to 
FOIA’s enactment, numerous agencies voiced concerns that profit-seeking firms 
and government contractors would seize on the Act as an instrument to 
undermine economic regulation.93 The single most persistent institutional critic 
of FOIA, tellingly, was not a national security agency or a White House office 
but the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.94 Apart from the news 
media, economic interests played a quiet part in these preenactment debates. 
But they played a major role in pressing for the APA provisions out of which 
FOIA grew,95 and they have been “crucial contributors” to the development of 
FOIA, as well as FOI laws abroad, ever since.96 
Businesses occupy a privileged position under FOIA in additional respects. 
In contrast to some of the Act’s foreign counterparts, private entities are not 
subject to FOIA, as a rule, regardless of how much public power they might 
wield or how much government contract work they might perform.97 Both the 
 
91 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 818 (1993) (suggesting that “citizen-based” 
enforcement of environmental laws is more common and effective in affluent communities); Eloise 
Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1413, 1420-50 (2011) (examining families’ use of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). 
92 Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 
803-04 (1967); cf. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 
1345 (noting that “[a]n army of lawyers . . . make their living litigating” FOIA exemptions). 
93 See Sam Lebovic, Seeing FOIA Like the State, or, How Administrative Opposition Shaped Freedom of 
Information, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY (David E. Pozen & Michael Schudson eds., forthcoming 
2018) (manuscript at 4-8) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lebovic, Seeing FOIA Like the State]. 
94 Id. at 4-5. Professor Lebovic concludes that while the predominance of commercial users 
“might have surprised the journalists who championed FOIA in the 1950s, . . . it would not have 
surprised the agencies in the 1960s.” Id. at 11. 
95 See Tom McClean, Who Pays the Piper? The Political Economy of Freedom of Information, 27 GOV’T 
INFO. Q. 392, 396 (2010) (“Although the justification for [the APA’s ‘public information’ section] was 
formally couched in terms of the democratic rights of private individuals, it is fairly clear that the 
specifically economic concerns of private enterprise were fundamentally what was at stake.”). 
96 Id. at 395. 
97 See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 4:5. Foreign laws have increasingly begun to supply a limited 
right of access to information held by private entities that contract with the government or perform 
“public functions.” See Private Bodies and Public Corporations, RIGHT2INFO.ORG (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.right2info.org/scope-of-bodies-covered-by-access-to-information/private-bodies-and-public 
-corporations [https://perma.cc/HFY5-RC8N]; see also Richard Calland, Exploring the Liberal Genealogy 
and the Changing Praxis of the Right of Access to Information: Towards an Egalitarian Realisation, THEORIA, 
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ideal of “freedom of information” and the evils of excessive secrecy are 
associated, legally and symbolically, with the public sector alone.98 Those firms 
that do contract with the government, moreover, have in FOIA an exceptionally 
broad “weapon” for obtaining “pre-litigation discovery” against their agency 
counterparts.99 Under so-called reverse FOIA procedures developed by the 
federal courts in the 1970s, companies that submit allegedly proprietary 
information to an agency may also bring suit to enjoin the agency from revealing 
it to a third party in response to a FOIA request or in certain other situations.100 
Before disclosing such information, agencies are required to give the submitter 
notice and an opportunity to object.101 The “looming possibility” of costly 
reverse FOIA litigation, consumer advocates have lamented, pushes agencies to 
“rubber-stamp company claims of commercial sensitivity.”102 In lieu of a 
legislative determination about how best to balance corporations’ confidentiality 
interests with FOIA’s openness goals, the reverse FOIA action has emerged 
through judicial and executive interpretation as a side entitlement that trumps 
the general rules where it applies.103 
 
Sept. 2014, at 70, 79 (discussing the “groundbreaking” and “deliberately progressive” application of 
South Africa’s 2000 Promotion of Access to Information Act to private actors). 
98 Cf. Ed Brown & Jonathan Cloke, Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the South: 
Assessing the International Anti-Corruption Crusade, 36 ANTIPODE 272, 291 (2004) (identifying an 
“anti-state bias” in the international anticorruption movement’s focus on the public sector); Irma E. 
Sandoval-Ballesteros, Rethinking Accountability and Transparency: Breaking the Public Sector Bias in 
Mexico, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 399, 403-10 (2014) (identifying an anti-“public sector bias” in 
access-to-information and anticorruption laws that exempt “private” actors). For an argument that 
corporations should be subject to FOI laws, see Roy Peled, Occupy Information: The Case for Freedom 
of Corporate Information, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 261 (2013). 
99 Justin M. Ganderson & Kevin T. Barnett, The Contractor’s Secret Weapon: Using FOIA When 
Asserting a Claim, PROCUREMENT L., Winter 2015, at 14, 14. As these practitioners explain: “A contractor 
can easily explore any topic or theory it desires through FOIA because of FOIA’s relatively limited 
restrictions. Under FOIA, a contractor is not limited to requesting relevant information reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it would be during a litigation. Instead, a 
contractor can ask for any information to explore any potential claim, such as those claims that it wouldn’t 
dare raise unless it had specific evidence supporting its theories.” Id. at 17. 
100 See generally DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 15, at 863-80 (explaining “reverse FOIA” 
actions). 
101 See id. at 876-79. New York Times reporter Sarah Cohen recently stated that, on account of 
reverse FOIA, she has “never successfully, ever, gotten a federal contract under FOIA.” Columbia 
Journalism Sch., FOIA@50 Conference Day 2 at 2:20:44, YOUTUBE (June 3, 2016), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=71D6z2YQzIM [https://perma.cc/7NAF-Z3BZ]. 
102 Vladeck, supra note 58, at 1793. 
103 Labor unions, in contrast, have largely failed in their efforts to persuade courts to grant 
them special status under FOIA. See, e.g., Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity Between 
Public and Private Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private 
Sector Workers, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 51, 71 n.124 (1995) (collecting cases in which “courts have held that 
unions were not allowed access to the names and addresses of public employees because it would 
constitute an invasion of their privacy under the FOIA”). 
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If reverse FOIA effectively shrinks the Act’s disclosure mandate in an 
industry-protective manner, a late-1990s revision expands it toward the same 
end. The Shelby Amendment (named after its Senate sponsor) provides that 
FOIA requesters may access “all data produced” by private entities that receive 
federal research grants104—but only when those entities are universities and 
other nonprofits, not when they are “similarly situated profit-seeking firms.”105 
Scholars have suggested that the goal of this amendment, which was 
championed by the tobacco lobby and the Chamber of Commerce, was to 
hamstring the EPA by letting critics inspect environmental “scientists’ work 
down to the smallest detail, giving them myriad new opportunities to discredit 
studies’ assumptions, methods of analysis, and conclusions, fairly or not.”106 
It might be thought that the progressivity of FOIA’s fee structure dispels or 
at least complicates the idea that commercial requesters have a privileged relation 
to the statute. The evidence suggests otherwise. Commercial use of FOIA did 
not fall off after the 1986 changes to the fee schedule, and the latest figures 
indicate that the government recoups less than one percent of compliance costs, 
conservatively estimated.107 Not only do FOIA’s profit-seeking users fail to 
cross-subsidize the more public-spirited users, but they also crowd the latter 
group out. The huge volume of commercial requests at some agencies, as 
Professor Margaret Kwoka has documented, substantially decreases the value of 
the average noncommercial request by lengthening response times and clogging 
avenues of appeal.108 It also likely deters many noncommercial requests from 
being submitted in the first place. FOIA, accordingly, ends up “transferring 
 
104 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–495 (1998). 
105 Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for Reflection and Choice, 
33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 347 (2004). For a detailed discussion of the Shelby Amendment and its 
administrative implementation, see generally ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42983, PUBLIC ACCESS TO DATA FROM FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH: PROVISIONS IN 
OMB CIRCULAR A-110 (2013). 
106 JASON ROSS ARNOLD, SECRECY IN THE SUNSHINE ERA 229 (2014). 
107 FREEDOM OF INFO. ACT FED. ADVISORY COMM., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., 
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: COMMITTEE TERM 2014–2016, at 10 (2016). Agencies 
themselves do not recoup a cent, as FOIA fees are paid to the General Fund of the Treasury. Id. 
Noncommercial requesters, meanwhile, continue to complain about the size of fees and the difficulty 
of obtaining fee waivers. See, e.g., FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 7, at 31-34 (providing examples of 
“outrageous fee estimates”); Zachary Pall, The High Costs of Costs: Fees as Barriers to Access Within the 
United States and Canadian Freedom of Information Régimes, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 
599, 628 (2009) (arguing that “the fee assessment system has become a barrier to access”). 
108 See Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1422-24; see also Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to 
Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The “Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 41, 43-44 (1994) (complaining that “[r]esponses to meaningful FOIA requests” are 
“delayed” by corporate requests for information about competitors). 
2017] Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act 1117 
wealth from the federal government to private enterprise” and amounts to a 
“corporate subsidy.”109 
The existence and effects of this subsidy are largely invisible to ordinary 
citizens, who continue to imagine journalists as the Act’s principal users.110 This 
invisibility, in turn, diminishes prospects for political opposition. Congress’s 
refusal to discriminate among different classes of FOIA requesters except at 
the margins is not as “egalitarian” as it appears,111 but rather tilts the production 
of information toward business interests. And Congress’s refusal to modify the 
FOIA entitlement has led to a steady decay in its worth to everyone else. 
To observe that FOIA is used mainly by commercial actors or that it supplies 
a hidden corporate subsidy is hardly to establish that the Act disserves social 
welfare or other goals. Business use of FOIA may redound to the public good in 
a number of ways.112 Yet if a full account of social costs and benefits would be 
enormously difficult to trace out, some basic distributional and political-economy 
implications seem clear enough (more will be considered shortly). FOIA’s 
request-driven structure, we can now see, invites a kind of corporate capture, which 
funnels government resources toward private industry, creates opportunities for 
informational arbitrage, increases companies’ leverage over agencies in litigation 
and negotiations, and compromises the Act’s participatory character.113 
Furthermore, none of the other legislative models for promoting executive branch 
transparency and accountability—from affirmative disclosure requirements to ex 
post checks on secret law to whistleblower protection measures—has such a strong 
structural affinity, if any, with business interests, as none of the other models 
similarly rations access to information according to persons’ means and 
motivation. Information “freeing” policies need not have a regressive, corporate 
skew. But our FOIA does. 
 
109 Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1415. 
110 See PELTZ-STEELE, supra note 25, at 129 (“A widely held misconception is that FOIAs are 
employed primarily by journalists . . . .”). 
111 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EXAMPLES 
AND EXPLANATIONS 370 (3d ed. 2009) (“FOIA is basically an egalitarian statute.”). 
112 See American Bar Association Symposium on FOIA 25th Anniversary, 9 GOV’T INFO. Q. 223, 249 
(1992) (remarks of Thomas Susman) (cataloging potential public benefits from business use of FOIA, 
including policing of “fraud, waste, and abuse” and “lower prices and increased competition that can 
result when a contractor finds out what the government is buying, what the specifications are, how the 
systems are configured, and what the government is paying in its procurement processes”). 
113 These effects, moreover, may be magnified in jurisdictions with relatively weak public sectors. 
See Calland, supra note 97, at 75 (suggesting that corporate domination of access-to-information laws 
“can have massive implications for states with weak or under-resourced governments but well-resourced 
and determined private actors, as is the case in many developing countries”). 
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2. National Security Secrecy 
FOIA was developed over the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s against the backdrop 
of, and partly in response to, the rise of national security secrecy. A web of 
nondisclosure policies and protocols began to take shape following World 
War II, and in 1951, President Truman established the first executive-wide 
classification system to govern nonmilitary as well as military information 
“the safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security.”114 
As the classification system swelled during the Cold War, concerned members 
of Congress and the media began to call for a new statute that could disrupt 
the culture of secrecy it had fostered.115 The original FOIA met resistance in 
this regard. In the 1973 case of EPA v. Mink, the Supreme Court rejected as 
“wholly untenable” a claim that the Act allowed plaintiffs to “subject the 
soundness of executive security classifications to judicial review.”116 One year 
later, Congress amended FOIA over President Ford’s veto with the express 
purpose of overruling Mink and fixing the “overclassification” problem, which 
had “by common consensus transformed the . . . classification scheme into an 
‘extravagant . . . system of denial.’”117 
The effort failed. Even though the 1974 amendments prescribe a de novo 
standard of review, courts have consistently afforded agencies great deference when 
classified information is at issue.118 In most Exemption 1 cases,119 courts grant the 
government summary judgment without allowing discovery or performing in 
camera inspection of the requested records, making it “virtually impossible for 
individual litigants to counter the opinions of agency personnel.”120 Courts have 
 
114 Exec. Order. No. 10,290, § 4, 3 C.F.R. 789, 790 (1949–1953); see also 1 ARVIN S. QUIST, 
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION 50-52 (2002) (discussing President Truman’s 
executive order and the “concern” it caused in Congress and the press). 
115 For a valuable discussion of this period, see SAM LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE 
NEWS: THE PARADOX OF PRESS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 164-89 (2016) [hereinafter LEBOVIC, 
FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS]. 
116 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973). 
117 Robert C. Post, Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 YALE 
L.J. 401, 419-20 (1976) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. S9316 (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (remarks of Sen. 
Kennedy)); see also David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 635-37 (2005) [hereinafter Pozen, Mosaic Theory] (summarizing 
the 1974 reforms). 
118 See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary 
Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 163-68 (2006); see also Kwoka, Deferring to Secrecy, supra note 9, at 
214 (“Despite two attempts by Congress to establish de novo judicial review of decisions to withhold 
records based on national security, courts acknowledge outright the deference they afford to claims 
of national security classification.”). 
119 Exemption 1 covers matters that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by 
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . are 
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012). 
120 Fuchs, supra note 118, at 164. Without clear statutory warrant, courts have also allowed 
agencies to give “Glomar responses” that refuse to confirm or deny the existence of requested records 
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been similarly deferential to intelligence agencies’ assertions of Exemption 3, 
which incorporates certain nondisclosure provisions of other statutes, including 
the CIA Act of 1949, the CIA Information Act of 1984, the National Security Act 
of 1947, and the National Security Agency (NSA) Act of 1959.121 The D.C. Circuit 
held in 1996 that the increasingly powerful National Security Council is exempt 
from FOIA altogether as a non-“agency” within the meaning of the statute.122 
“[M]eaningful victories in national security FOIA cases,” in the experience of 
leading litigators, “remain legal unicorns.”123 Exemptions 1 and 3, furthermore, 
have been used by the intelligence agencies to shake free not only from record 
requests but also from FOIA’s affirmative disclosure obligations, with the result 
that these agencies “rarely, if ever,” publish the rules governing their activities.124 
While the courts were developing these doctrines, the national secrecy 
state grew and grew.125 By 2004, some suspected that “as many as a trillion 
pages” were classified in the United States, or the equivalent of “200 Libraries 
of Congress.”126 Commentators from across the political spectrum describe the 
 
on the ground that this fact is itself classifiable. See generally Nathan Freed Wessler, Note, “[We] Can 
Neither Confirm Nor Deny the Existence or Nonexistence of Records Responsive to Your Request”: Reforming 
the Glomar Response Under FOIA, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1381 (2010). 
121 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); see also GOITEIN, supra note 63, at 45 (noting that the “CIA’s website,” 
like the NSA’s, “makes clear that it considers almost any information about its activities . . . to be 
shielded by Exemption 3”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, STATUTES FOUND 
TO QUALIFY UNDER EXEMPTION 3 OF THE FOIA (2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/page/file
/623931/download [https://perma.cc/BES7-XP4E] (listing statutory provisions found to authorize 
Exemption 3 withholding). A number of other countries’ FOI laws explicitly carve out the intelligence 
services in full or in part. See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 34-35 (providing examples). 
122 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 565-67 (D.C. Cir. 1996). For a critique 
of this decision, see Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off the Record: The National Security Council, Drone 
Killings, and Historical Accountability, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (2014). 
123 David McCraw, FOIA Litigation Has Its Own Rules, But We Deserve Better, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 
15, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/29974/foia-litigation-rules-deserve [https://perma.cc/JJL6-6KKJ]. 
A 1995 review by DOJ identified eighteen FOIA cases since 1979 in which a court had ordered disclosure 
of classified information; these orders were “often, but not always, overturned on appeal.” History of 
Exemption 1 Disclosure Orders, FOIA UPDATE, Spring/Summer 1995, at 4, 12, https://www.justice.gov
/oip/blog/foia-update-litigation-review-history-exemption-1-disclosure-orders [https://perma.cc/ZN6
Q-8SGS]. A more recent study estimated that five percent of cases involving Exemption 1 result in an 
“outright win” for the plaintiff (down to three percent since 9/11), and less than twenty percent “lead 
to even partial disclosure.” Susan Nevelow Mart & Tom Ginsburg, [Dis-]Informing the People’s Discretion: 
Judicial Deference Under the National Security Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 66 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 725, 728 (2014). These estimates almost certainly overstate plaintiffs’ success rate, given that 
the authors exclude unreported cases and include cases in which Exemption 1 may have played only 
a minor role. See id. at 765 & n.213. 
124 GOITEIN, supra note 63, at 45; see also Jameel Jaffer & Brett Max Kaufman, A Resurgence of Secret 
Law, 126 YALE L.J.F. 242, 249-50 (2016) (criticizing judicial rulings that exclude national-security-related 
opinions by DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel from FOIA’s affirmative disclosure requirements on the 
ground that these opinions do not constitute authoritative “working law”). 
125 I borrow the phrase “national secrecy state” from LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE 
NEWS, supra note 115, at 166; and Jon Wiener, The National Secrecy State, NATION, Dec. 21, 1998, at 27. 
126 Peter Galison, Removing Knowledge, 31 CRITICAL INQUIRY 229, 230 (2004). 
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classification system as “staggeringly large”127 and “out of control.”128 FOIA 
has proven so profoundly unresponsive to the rise of national security 
secrecy—and therefore to the rise of government secrecy—that we might even 
say there is an element of transparency theater in the conceit that the Act secures 
the people’s right to know.129 “In the war for executive accountability,” as one 
veteran civil liberties lawyer has reflected, “FOIA is a slingshot attempting to 
pierce the tank armor of government secrecy and over-classification.”130 
The slingshot does some damage. Plaintiffs occasionally prevail in cases 
involving the national security exemption.131 More important, in the shadow 
of judicial review, the FOIA process can spur recalcitrant agencies to release 
certain previously classified records on their own or pursuant to settlement 
agreements with journalists and NGOs.132 The supine judicial record 
understates the degree to which FOIA generates disclosure. Notwithstanding 
this important qualification, however, even the most optimistic assessment 
 
127 Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
489, 491 (2007). 
128 JOINT SEC. COMM’N, REDEFINING SECURITY 6 (1994); see also ELIZABETH GOITEIN & 
DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING OVERCLASSIFICATION 
THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 4-6 (2011) (documenting the consensus view inside and outside 
government that there is “widespread overclassification”). 
129 See LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS, supra note 115, at 166, 189 (describing 
FOIA as “a superficial response” and “a weak ameliorative” to the explosive growth of secrecy during 
the Cold War); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 935 (2006) 
(suggesting that laws like FOIA “fail to enforce disclosure requirements in the areas of federal 
governmental performance where they are most needed: to evaluate decisions regarding such key 
political issues as national security and foreign relations”). FOI laws have generated a more 
egregious sort of transparency theater in countries such as Zimbabwe, where “the dictatorship of 
Robert Mugabe twisted a FOI statute into a gag law for limiting access to previously available 
information.” Michener, supra note 49, at 147. On the analogous concept of “security theater,” see 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD 38-40 (2003). 
130 Baher Azmy, An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency: Some Reflections on Jack Goldsmith’s 
Power and Constraint, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 23, 36 (2012) (book review). 
131 See supra note 123. Plaintiffs fare somewhat better in the face of the law enforcement 
exemption (Exemption 7), although in this area, too, agencies like the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation have benefited from broad judicial construction. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA 779-80 (11th ed. 
2012); see also David E. McCraw, The “Freedom from Information” Act: A Look Back at Nader, FOIA, 
and What Went Wrong, 126 YALE L.J.F. 232, 239 (2016) (“The Department of Justice’s Guide to the 
Freedom of Information Act catalogs one decision after another in which the application of Exemption 
7 has spun free of both the statutory language and the exemption’s rationale.”). 
132 For rich elaborations of these and related dynamics, see JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND 
CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 112-18 (2012); Kreimer, supra note 
89, at 1053-56; and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Access to National Security Information Under the US Freedom 
of Information Act, 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES GOUVERNEMENTS OUVERTS 257, 264-66 
(2015) (Fr.). 
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must concede that the Act has supplied “only a weak, somewhat unpredictable 
weapon for challenging executive control of national security information.”133 
Perhaps, as Professor Adam Samaha has suggested, “FOIA never had a 
chance” to curb overclassification, given its design.134 If so, then it behooves us 
to consider alternative designs. FOIA’s ability to constrain classification depends 
not only on the willingness of sophisticated requesters to bring lawsuits, but also 
on the willingness of judges to order disclosure with at least some regularity in 
the absence of a noninformational injury and in the face of an executive branch 
claim that doing so would cause national security harm. The collapse of de novo 
review under Exemption 1 casts doubt on whether the latter precondition can be 
met.135 Even if judicial review could be strengthened through legislation or 
otherwise, the combination of FOIA’s request-driven structure and the sheer 
size and complexity of the classification system consigns the Act to a peripheral 
role.136 Only by addressing the standards, procedures, or incentives that govern 
the classification (and declassification) process could Congress hope to push 
back against national security secrecy in a systematic fashion. 
At the time FOIA was passed in 1966 and then overhauled in 1974, such a 
statute was conceivable. Prior to 1966, Congress had never clearly accepted the 
legitimacy of the executive-wide classification system.137 As public support for 
the presidency plummeted during the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, 
a policy window opened in which Congress was willing and able to overcome 
partisan division and presidential vetoes to enact a series of framework statutes 
with the aim of reining in the executive branch, including on national security 
matters.138 Committees of both houses actively considered bills that would legislate 
a security classification system.139 Rather than seek to revamp the classification 
process, however, Congress opted in the end for the indirect FOIA model and 
the pointillistic resolution of secrecy disputes on a case-by-case basis. In so doing, 
 
133 Schulhofer, supra note 132, at 268. 
134 Samaha, supra note 17, at 940-41. Samaha stresses that FOIA may nonetheless facilitate 
disclosure “far upstream from litigation.” Id. at 940. 
135 Nor does the international record seem promising. Although I am not aware of any rigorous 
comparative work on the question, academic and NGO commentaries on FOI laws in other 
countries routinely describe the national security exemptions as broad and judicial review of their 
use as highly deferential. See, e.g., David Banisar, Public Oversight and National Security: Comparative 
Approaches to Freedom of Information, in DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES 217, 
226-27 (Hans Born & Marina Caparini eds., 2007). 
136 Cf. Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 406 (2009) (“[A]t its best, FOIA only facilitates access to specific records; it does 
not and cannot alter the practices and procedures that make them inaccessible in the first place.”). 
137 See LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS, supra note 115, at 188. 
138 See Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive Credibility 
Gap, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 247, 254 (2008) (placing FOIA in this historical context). 
139 See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-298 GOV, MANAGING SECRECY: 
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION REFORM—THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT PROPOSAL 4 (1998). 
1122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1097 
Congress effectively blessed the modern classification regime for the first 
time;140 conceded the definition of “national security” to the executive;141 
channeled civil society resistance to the national security state away from the 
political arena and toward the courts; and arguably created a perverse incentive 
for officials to classify more, not less, in order to avail themselves of Exemption 
1.142 The policy window closed. Congress also failed to develop a framework for 
declassifying or otherwise affirmatively disclosing national security 
information that no longer needs to be kept secret. Even today, following a 
wave of declassification-promoting reforms in recent years,143 the entire 
appropriated budget of NARA—which houses both the National 
Declassification Center and the Information Security Oversight Office and 
plays a leading role on declassification as well as records management144—is 
smaller than the annual cost of implementing FOIA.145 
As in the preceding Section, to observe that FOIA offers a weak corrective 
to national security secrecy is merely to raise and frame, not to answer, some 
difficult questions about the law’s ultimate worth. There may well be deep 
structural forces in the American state that would oppose any effort to 
minimize classification;146 from this perspective, FOIA’s weakness in the 
national security field seems predictable, if not overdetermined. It is 
nonetheless important to appreciate the particular limitations of the Act in this 
field and the way they relate to its “reactionary,” request-driven design. Not 
only did FOIA’s legislative sponsors fail to solve or even seriously confront the 
overclassification problem when they empowered private parties to bring 
lawsuits in pursuit of specific records, but they also helped to entrench and 
legitimate the emerging classification system. The result is a freedom of 
information law that leaves the Cold War national secrecy state largely intact, 
 
140 See LEBOVIC, FREE SPEECH AND UNFREE NEWS, supra note 115, at 188 (“In 1966, in its 
Freedom of Information Act, Congress did not challenge the legitimacy of the classification system, 
but acknowledged it.”). 
141 Cf. Pozen, Mosaic Theory, supra note 117, at 637 (noting that the executive has the “advantage 
in FOIA appeals of controlling both the disputed information and—through Exemption 1’s reliance 
on executive orders—the definition of national security”). 
142 See Scalia, supra note 74, at 15 (asserting that agencies “overclassified documents to take 
advantage of the ‘national security’ exemption” in the original FOIA). 
143 See Aftergood, supra note 136, at 407-11 (reviewing some of these reforms). 
144 See NARA and Declassification, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/declassification 
[https://perma.cc/X475-GF6R] (last updated Dec. 29, 2016) (providing information on NARA’s 
declassification activities). 
145 Compare DOJ FY 2015 SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 20 (reporting that FOIA cost approximately 
$480 million to administer in fiscal year 2015), with NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., FY 2015 
SUMMARY REPORT 14 (2016) (reporting that NARA received approximately $386 million from current-
year appropriations in fiscal year 2015). 
146 See Pozen, Leaky Leviathan, supra note 67, at 582 (providing an account of why “[u]nwinding 
overclassification is exceedingly difficult to do”). 
2017] Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act 1123 
while substantially limiting the space for government secret-keeping—and 
decisive action—on domestic policy matters. 
B. FOIA Losers 
In ways both subtle and obvious, I have suggested, FOIA confers special 
benefits on certain commercial and national security interests—and these 
distributional ramifications should not be seen as perversions of the Act so 
much as natural byproducts of its structure. For those with progressive priors 
at least, a discomfiting picture of transparency’s “crown jewel”147 begins to 
come into focus. The picture becomes still more discomfiting when one 
considers FOIA’s effects on the administrative process and on the depiction 
of government in the public sphere. 
1. The FOIA Tax: Bureaucratic Capacity and Legitimacy 
Like the prevalence of commercial requests and the deference shown to 
the government in national security cases, the basic point that FOIA 
inconveniences agencies is familiar from the literature (as well as common 
sense). Commentators not infrequently mention, in passing, that responding 
to FOIA requests can be “a significant burden.”148 Critics note that Congress 
grossly underestimated compliance costs when writing and rewriting the Act 
in 1966 and 1974.149 Advocates respond by pointing to obscure federal 
programs with a comparable price tag.150 The discourse, such as it is, has 
become narrow and stale. As with the subjects of commercial use and national 
security secrecy, the familiar concerns about FOIA’s administrative burden 
need to be pushed further, for they contain the seeds of a more interesting 
and important critique. 
For starters, the official estimates of FOIA’s cost should be understood as 
a lower bound. As required by the Act,151 DOJ prepares annual reports that 
state the “total estimated cost of all FOIA related activities across the 
 
147 See TED GUP, NATION OF SECRETS: THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY AND THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 119 (2007) (describing FOIA as “the crown jewel of transparency”). 
148 Tomlinson, supra note 39, at 124; see also, e.g., Scalia, supra note 74, at 16 (“[FOIA has] greatly 
burdened investigative agencies and the courts.”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal 
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1333 (1972) (“[C]ompliance 
with the FOIA is costly, time-consuming and complex . . . .”). I have not seen any detailed analysis 
of these burdens. 
149 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 74, at 16 (contending that “a single request under [the 1974 FOIA 
amendments]” cost more than four times the amount the House Committee Report estimated the 
amendments would cost for an entire year). 
150 The de rigueur comparison for many years was to “military bands.” See, e.g., Wichmann III, 
supra note 7, at 1255 & n.286. 
151 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(1)(O) (2012). 
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[executive branch].”152 This figure was $480,235,967.62 in fiscal year 2015.153 
Even in standard budgetary terms, that sum seems too low. When calculating 
their FOIA-related costs, agencies are advised by DOJ to include “salaries of 
FOIA personnel, overhead, and any other FOIA-related expenses.”154 
Agencies are not expressly advised to include—and, according to the former 
President of the American Society of Access Professionals, often fail to 
include155—the nonsalary compensation of FOIA personnel; the prorated 
salaries, benefits, and overhead associated with employees who provide clerical 
or technical support to FOIA personnel; or the prorated salaries, benefits, and 
overhead associated with the much larger pool of employees who contribute 
to FOIA administration on an ad hoc basis (as explained two paragraphs 
below). DOJ’s costing methodology is thus conservative as well as imprecise. 
The entire enterprise is also misleadingly narrow, in my view, because FOIA 
imposes numerous harder-to-quantify “costs” on the administrative state. 
Beyond the monetary compliance costs that are DOJ’s focus, FOIA imposes 
what we might call diversion costs insofar as it diverts the attention of 
employees away from an agency’s substantive mission.156 This phenomenon 
occurs in plain sight when non-FOIA personnel are assigned to perform the 
duties of FOIA personnel. Congressional underfunding puts pressure on 
agencies to make such reassignments on a regular basis. In fiscal year 2015, 
the Department of Defense had over 375 employees functioning as the 
“equivalent” of “full-time FOIA employees,” versus an official FOIA staff of 
349.157 DOJ’s dollar estimates capture the former group’s salaries but not the 
opportunity cost of its lost labor on other matters. 
 
152 DOJ FY 2015 SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 20. 
153 Id. 
154 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HANDBOOK FOR AGENCY ANNUAL 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REPORTS 55 (2013). 
155 Telephone Interview with Frederick J. Sadler (July 11, 2016). Sadler further observed that 
DOJ’s instruction to count the overhead of FOIA personnel is “insufficiently defined” and “probably 
results in under-reporting” of overhead expenses for many FOIA offices. Email from Frederick J. 
Sadler to David Pozen, Professor of Law, Columbia L. Sch. (Aug. 24, 2016) (on file with author). 
156 Compliance with FOIA is seen by few, if any, agency heads as part of their agency’s 
mission. See generally Suzanne J. Piotrowski & David H. Rosenbloom, Nonmission-Based Values in 
Results-Oriented Public Management: The Case of Freedom of Information, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 643 
(2002) (demonstrating this point through a review of agencies’ performance plans). Although I focus 
here on dynamics within the executive branch, FOIA also diverts the attention of federal judges and 
their staffs from other cases. See, e.g., Savage v. CIA, 826 F.2d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.) 
(“We cannot forbear to express concern about the waste of judicial resources that is involved in 
allowing a person to obtain two levels of federal judicial review of an agency’s denial of a [modest 
FOIA fee waiver claim].”). 
157 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) ANNUAL REPORT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 45 (2016) (capitalization omitted). The Department of Defense has an unusually 
large FOIA operation. The Department of the Treasury, by way of comparison, had approximately 
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Even if Congress were to appropriate substantially larger sums for 
dedicated FOIA personnel,158 non-FOIA personnel would still find 
themselves diverted by the Act from other matters. Responding to FOIA 
requests frequently requires that the employees of non-FOIA offices search 
their emails and files for responsive records, and that a subset of these 
employees work with FOIA staff to assess such issues as whether a given 
record is responsive, whether the requester should be asked to narrow the 
scope of her inquiry, whether the request implicates reverse FOIA, and the 
applicability of the Act’s vaguely worded exemptions to particular documents 
or to passages or names therein.159 An air of wariness pervades some of these 
interactions. The permanent FOIA bureaucracy is so disconnected, culturally 
and programmatically, from many agency components that even the most 
FOIA-respectful front office cannot take for granted that the agency’s 
institutional interests or its lawful secrets would be safeguarded in an 
unsupervised compliance process.160 For the same set of reasons, no amount of 
automation could eliminate these diversion costs, which arise in part out of the 
need for policy expertise and practical judgment in the Act’s implementation.161 
As the volume of FOIA requests rises, then, so will the drain on non-FOIA 
employees’ time, resources, and focus.162 
FOIA can also make it more difficult for agencies to work with private 
parties on a cooperative basis. As the initial version of the Act began to move 
through Congress, some agencies complained that it would increase their 
 
ninety-nine “[e]quivalent” and forty-seven official full-time FOIA employees in fiscal year 2015. U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2015 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2016). 
158 Individual agencies, again, receive nothing from FOIA fees. See supra note 107. 
159 In its handout for new federal employees, DOJ’s Office of Information Policy stresses that 
“FOIA is everyone’s responsibility. Any documents you create or maintain as part of your job may be 
responsive to a FOIA request. FOIA professionals at your agency . . . may call on you for assistance in 
searching for responsive records and reviewing those records for release.” Infographic of The Freedom 
of Information Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFF. INFO. POL’Y, https://www.justice.gov/sites
/default/files/oip/pages/attachments/2015/03/13/foia_infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CMX-PB4L]. 
160 See supra notes 37–45 and accompanying text (noting the high degree of decentralization and 
low degree of bureaucratic status that has traditionally characterized FOIA work). The growing use of 
contractors for FOIA services exacerbates these concerns. Cf. Hogan, supra note 42, at 22 (discussing 
the lack of “day-to-day oversight” of FOIA contract workers (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
161 On the potential for automated systems to facilitate FOIA processing, see Cindy Dillow, The 
Role of Automation in FOIA Compliance, INFO. MGMT., Jan./Feb. 2016, at 37. Both governmental and 
nongovernmental automated systems have recently been introduced to facilitate FOIA requesting. 
See, e.g., FOIA MACHINE, https://www.foiamachine.org [https://perma.cc/6L54-LBHT]; FOIAONLINE, 
https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home [https://perma.cc/7FU7-3Z46]. The analysis 
above shows why, from an agency’s perspective, any efficiency gains from these developments are likely to 
be offset by the costs of expanding the requester pool through free online submission tools. 
162 Anecdotal accounts suggest that this drain may already be substantial in some agencies. See, 
e.g., Michael A. Rodgers, Freedom of Information Act Requests: Six Keys to Handling Them, DEF. AT&L, 
Jan.–Feb. 2016, at 50, 50 (stating that, in the author’s experience, FOIA requests “consistently caused 
program and contracting personnel to become distracted from their mission”). 
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contracting and procurement costs by revealing what they were willing to accept 
or expend in contract negotiations and other transactions.163 Once agencies 
have entered into commercial agreements, these costs may be raised still 
higher by their counterparts’ use of FOIA to suss out potential claims that 
might be brought in litigation.164 Other agencies worried in the 1960s that 
FOIA would increase their information acquisition costs by making regulated 
firms and their employees more reluctant to share frank accounts of their 
activities, lest those accounts (and the names of informants) be requested and 
then used to their detriment.165 Although the development of reverse FOIA 
and related doctrines mitigates this risk,166 there is some evidence to suggest 
that it continues to undermine “government efforts to collect information 
about industries, products, and markets.”167 
Along with other 1970s-era transparency measures such as the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (FACA)168 and the Government in the Sunshine Act 
(GITSA),169 FOIA imposes deliberation costs as well.170 To some unknown but 
seemingly nontrivial extent, the prospect of “being FOIA’d” deters candor 
among executive branch officials and leads them to avoid recordkeeping in favor 
of oral exchanges and “sub rosa deals.”171 The Act’s deliberative privilege 
 
163 See Lebovic, Seeing FOIA Like the State, supra note 93, at 5. 
164 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
165 See Lebovic, Seeing FOIA Like the State, supra note 93, at 6-8. Even if a firm felt reasonably 
confident that its data would be protected, this fear might nonetheless be invoked strategically as a 
basis for withholding. 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 100–101. 
167 Cate et al., supra note 108, at 44; see also, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., HOMELAND SEC. 
PROJECT, CYBER SECURITY TASK FORCE: PUBLIC-PRIVATE INFORMATION SHARING 6 (2012) 
(“Another chilling effect on sharing [information with the federal government] comes from the 
concern that private proprietary information compiled in government databases will be discoverable 
through [FOIA] requests.”). The fact that Congress took pains in the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 to clarify that voluntarily submitted “critical infrastructure information” is exempt under 
FOIA, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 214, 116 Stat. 2135, 2152-55 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133 (2012)), attests 
to the persistence of this “chilling” concern. 
168 Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012)). 
169 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 5 and 39 U.S.C.). 
170 Because FACA and GITSA require open meetings and not just accessible records, their 
deliberative costs may well be greater than FOIA’s where they apply. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, 
JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 425 (6th ed. 2014) (“It is increasingly clear that, 
while [GITSA] has opened commission meetings to public scrutiny, it has done so at some injury 
to the process of decisionmaking.”); Steven J. Mulroy, Sunlight’s Glare: How Overbroad Open 
Government Laws Chill Free Speech and Hamper Effective Democracy, 78 TENN. L. REV. 309, 360-67 
(2011) (reviewing evidence that open meetings laws “chill discussion,” hamper compromise, generate 
evasive behavior, and shift power to staff and lobbyists); see also Mark E. Warren & Jane Mansbridge, 
Deliberative Negotiation, in POLITICAL NEGOTIATION: A HANDBOOK 141, 177 (Jane Mansbridge & 
Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2016) (“By now, the empirical evidence on the deliberative benefits of closed-
door interactions seems incontrovertible.”). 
171 Adam Candeub, Transparency in the Administrative State, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 393 (2013); 
see also Herz, supra note 16, at 584-85 (“FOIA imposes no obligation to generate, compile or interpret 
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exemption responds to this concern, but only partially.172 Recent lawsuits, for 
example, have clarified that opinions by DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
are not categorically covered by this exemption;173 as FOIA users have 
increasingly started requesting such opinions, agencies have increasingly 
stopped turning to OLC for legal advice.174 Researchers have identified similarly 
perverse consequences of FOI laws on the quality of decisionmaking, as well as 
the production of transparency, at the state level175 and in foreign countries.176 
FOIA imposes additional political and agenda-setting costs on agencies by giving 
those who oppose their work a low-cost tool with which to harass and embarrass 
them. Businesses and trade groups threatened by a new regulatory or enforcement 
policy use FOIA to “dig up dirt” on the policy and the people behind it.177 They 
also use FOIA to extract large volumes of background documentation, which they 
then communicate back to the agency in an effort to “overload” its staff and shape 
the administrative record.178 Nonprofit organizations that object on ideological 
grounds to an agency’s mission or to its leadership employ similar tactics, backed 
up by a continuous succession of FOIA lawsuits.179 
These tactics often have a partisan valence. On the libertarian right, FOIA is 
celebrated as a means to impede “the Statists” at disfavored agencies through “witch 
 
information. The statute applies solely to ‘records’ which exist independently of the statute. Thus, 
it creates some disincentive to create records . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Output 
Transparency vs. Input Transparency, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 93 (manuscript at 
13) (“[O]ne of the consequences of FOIA is to reduce reliance on email and written documents.”). 
But see Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1018 (identifying “[s]tructural features of the federal government, 
and of records themselves, [that] raise barriers to keeping initiatives entirely ‘off the books’”). 
172 The volume of litigation over this exemption (Exemption 5) in itself suggests that officials cannot 
casually rely on it. See PATRICK BIRKINSHAW, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: THE LAW, THE PRACTICE 
AND THE IDEAL 466-67 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that Exemption 5 is the most litigated FOIA exemption). 
173 See Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript 
at 40 nn.183–84), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/16_10_24_Renan_Law
%20Presidents%20Make.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3WN-7AGD] (collecting such cases). 
174 See id. at 39, 44; Jack Goldsmith, The Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.law
fareblog.com/decline-olc [https://perma.cc/93RF-LANV]. 
175 See, e.g., R. Karl Rethemeyer, The Empires Strike Back: Is the Internet Corporatizing Rather than 
Democratizing Policy Processes?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 199, 206 (2007) (finding through interviews 
that state agency heads avoid using internet communications so as not to “leave[] traces that are 
subject to the FOIA”). 
176 See, e.g., David Cuillier, The People’s Right to Know: Comparing Harold L. Cross’s Pre-FOIA World 
to Post-FOIA Today, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 437 (2016) (describing studies that suggest certain FOI 
laws, such as Kosovo’s, “actually hinder access by providing public officials legal rationales for delays, 
excessive copy fees, and denial”); Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 98, at 418-19 (discussing techniques 
used by Mexican bureaucrats to avoid FOI requests). 
177 Rethemeyer, supra note 175, at 206. 
178 See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE 
L.J. 1321, 1380 n.224 (2010). 
179 Cf. James O’Reilly, ACUS, FOIA & Arbitration: Breakthrough or Fool’s Errand?, ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS, Fall 2013, at 9, 9 (“The 13,000-plus requesters who have sued under FOIA since 
1967 have predominantly been financially motivated or ideologically hostile to an agency program.”). 
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hunts” and “[f]ishing expeditions.”180 The conservative Judicial Watch foundation 
came to prominence over the past two decades largely by using FOIA to “trip up” 
Democratic officials.181 Freedom Watch now plows the same ground.182 There is no 
comparable outfit (Civic Solidarity Watch?) on the progressive left.183 In the 
environmental area, FOIA-fueled witch hunts and fishing expeditions have become 
so serious that a legal defense fund was established in 2011 specifically to help 
climate scientists fend off “malicious freedom of information act requests.”184 These 
oppositional uses of FOIA not only exacerbate diversion and deliberation costs but 
also alter the political sociology of agency action, making it harder for 
administrators to formulate and carry out affirmative agendas of all kinds. 
To be sure, while the FOIA “tax” on government service and agency 
decisionmaking may be uncommonly intrusive, some of these sorts of costs are 
familiar to American administrative law. FACA and GITSA, as already noted, 
have been critiqued on deliberative grounds,185 and scholars continue to debate 
whether the APA itself excessively (or insufficiently) hampers regulation.186 
Whatever the best view of these other statutes, it is long past time for such 
sustained, sober attention to FOIA’s impact on the administrative process, 
especially as the annual volume of requests heads toward the one million mark.187 
 
180 CHRISTOPHER C. HORNER, THE LIBERAL WAR ON TRANSPARENCY: CONFESSIONS 
OF A FREEDOM OF INFORMATION “CRIMINAL” 195, 229 (2012). Now a senior fellow at the 
Competitive Enterprise Institute, the author of this book is a prominent FOIA attorney and 
“climate-truth watchdog.” Andrea Billups, Chris Horner, FOIA Watchdog, Demands Transparency from 
Government’s Global Warming Advocates, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.washington
examiner.com/chris-horner-foia-watchdog-demands-transparency-from-governments-global-warming-a
dvocates/article/2544632 [https://perma.cc/UAU8-K5CG]. 
181 Oliver Willis, Meet Judicial Watch, A Driving Force Behind the Clinton Email Story That Keeps Duping 
the Press, MEDIA MATTERS (Oct. 2, 2015), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2015/10/02/meet-judicial-watch
-a-driving-force-behind-the/205941 [https://perma.cc/65SM-P4U3]. 
182 See, e.g., Michael Macagnone, Freedom Watch Guns for Clinton Emails at DC Circ., LAW360 (Apr. 
2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/638115/freedom-watch-guns-for-clinton-emails-at-dc-circ [https
://perma.cc/W5DJ-Z3VY]. 
183 Civil libertarian organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation use FOIA frequently and skillfully in the national security field. See 
Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1024. But the Act only skims the surface of this field, see supra subsection 
II.A.2, and the weaponization of FOIA is not a defining feature for these organizations, or for 
liberal-leaning transparency groups such as the National Freedom of Information Coalition or the 
Open Government Partnership, as it is for Judicial Watch. 
184 About, CLIMATE SCI. LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://climatesciencedefensefund.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/U696-XZEG]. 
185 See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text. 
186 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 97 nn.5–6 (2003) (collecting sources on both sides of this debate). Although 
beyond the scope of this Article, an analysis that situates FOIA within the historical development 
of the APA and compares their political economies could deepen our understanding of both statutes. 
187 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting the 700,000-plus FOIA requests made in 
fiscal year 2015). 
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And to be sure, the burdens highlighted here are difficult to measure and 
must be considered alongside FOIA’s potential benefits, not only for society 
at large but also for the administrative process. The principal benefit that is 
touted in this regard—seen by many as “the principal inspiration for the 
FOIA” and “its symbolic central pillar”—is the Act’s promise “to ensure that 
public servants . . . serve the public and not themselves.”188 In other words, 
the costs that FOIA piles on agencies are thought to reduce agency costs for 
Congress and the American people by helping to keep executive branch officials 
on the straight and narrow. This, in turn, may redound to the bureaucracy’s 
benefit by making its principals feel more confident in granting it authority 
and resources. Part III will raise a number of questions about the “watchdog” 
rationale for FOIA, including whether it has lost force over time. For the 
moment, though, it bears note that (i) there is no evidence that the Act has 
enhanced popular or congressional confidence in federal agencies and thereby 
laid a foundation for their long-term empowerment,189 and that (ii) any positive 
effect on governance through this monitoring mechanism is itself highly 
speculative. Social scientists do not appear to have seriously investigated, much 
less developed a consensus on, FOIA’s role in ensuring that public servants 
serve the public and not themselves.190 Just as more empirical work is needed 
 
188 Glenn Dickinson, Comment, The Supreme Court’s Narrow Reading of the Public Interest Served 
by the Freedom of Information Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 197 (1990); see also Cate et al., supra note 
108, at 42 (“First and most important [of Congress’s purposes], the FOIA plainly facilitates the 
watchdog function of the public over the government: The public must have access to the 
government information necessary to ensure that government officials act in the public interest.”); 
William Safire, Free Speech v. Scalia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1985, at A17 (asserting that FOIA “has 
done more to inhibit the abuse of Government power . . . than any legislation in our lifetime”). 
189 See infra notes 217–224 and accompanying text; see also Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1073 n.241 
(observing that the claim that “transparency is likely to be provided by government agents as a 
means of establishing their trustworthiness and inducing principals to grant them broader authority 
and resources . . . seems less than fully persuasive in [the FOIA] setting” (citation omitted)). 
190 It is clear (and not at all speculative) that the work of many federal officials has been 
publicized through FOIA, which generates retail accountability in the form of reputational and 
other consequences when that work is seen to be faulty. What is far less clear is whether FOIA has 
improved the quality of administrative action in a larger, lasting sense. 
To my knowledge, no scholarship has tackled this question directly. At the state level, some 
research suggests that “stronger” FOI laws may be associated with reduced rates of public corruption 
convictions. See Adriana S. Cordis & Patrick L. Warren, Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect of State 
Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 18, 30-36 (2014). Beyond the 
United States, a new cross-national study finds that FOI laws are associated with greater 
“bureaucratic efficiency,” but only if accompanied by a high degree of media freedom, NGO activity, 
and political competitiveness. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Arusha Cooray, Do Freedom of 
Information Laws Improve Bureaucratic Efficiency? An Empirical Investigation, 68 OXFORD ECON. 
PAPERS 968, 987-91 (2016); see also id. at 968-69 (describing the literature on FOI laws’ impact on 
governance as “scant”). Other cross-national studies report negligible or negative correlations 
between FOI laws and governance indicators. See Samia Costa, Do Freedom of Information Laws 
Decrease Corruption?, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1317, 1317 (2012) (finding that “countries that adopted 
FOI laws saw an increase in perceived corruption and a decrease in the quality of governance”); 
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to bear out the relatively novel concerns raised by this Article, more empirical 
work is needed to bear out the classic anti-abuse case for FOIA. 
The normative structure of this watchdog rationale also warrants reflection. 
In a world in which bureaucrats are believed to be mendacious, corrupt, or 
otherwise ill-motivated, it may make sense to trade off some significant amount 
of administrative burden for the prospect of discipline through disclosure.191 
This tradeoff starts to look less sensible, however, when the relevant 
bureaucracies are already highly regulated and professionalized and when the 
disclosure policy largely gives a pass to the state’s least visible, most violent 
components. FOIA’s watchdog rationale ignores these complexities and 
embodies a deeply skeptical set of assumptions about the administrative process, 
along with an inherently delegitimating vision of government—a liberalism of 
fear.192 It privileges a conception of accountability as restraint, rather than 
responsiveness. It conflates good agency action with non-abusive agency action. 
So thoroughly has this vision shaped the academic and popular discourses 
on FOIA that when it is observed that officials sometimes try to avoid the Act 
by communicating orally193 or that there is a “long standing FOIA-averse 
attitude common within most executive administrations,”194 the observations 
are taken to confirm the very governmental crookedness that makes FOIA 
indispensable. These data points, however, are equally consistent with the 
 
Monica Escaleras et al., Freedom of Information Acts and Public Sector Corruption, 145 PUB. CHOICE 
435, 455 (2010) (finding “no significant relationship between FOI acts and corruption” in developed 
countries, and “rising levels of corruption” associated with FOI acts in developing countries). The 
qualitative literature is similarly thin and inconclusive. See, e.g., Ben Worthy, More Open but Not More 
Trusted? The Effect of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 on the United Kingdom Central Government, 
23 GOVERNANCE 561, 571 (2010) (“In the United Kingdom, interviews with officials found little 
evidence of FOI having positively impacted upon the quality of advice given to ministers, the quality 
of records made, the evidence base, or relations with third parties.”). 
191 Transparency strategies, as Professor Frederick Schauer has observed, are inherently 
conservative insofar as they reduce the likelihood of both very bad and very good decisions. See Schauer, 
supra note 92, at 1351-54. “In some times and places,” Schauer reflects, “such conservatism is well 
justified. If I were a Zimbabwean, I would worry considerably about bad decisions made outside of 
the gaze of the population and the international community, but I would not worry very much about 
preventing good decisions by the government of Robert Mugabe.” Id. at 1353. 
192 See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 237 (1984) (describing a “liberalism of fear,” 
traceable to Montesquieu, that “concentrates . . . single-mindedly on limited and predictable 
government”); see also COREY ROBIN, FEAR: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL IDEA 147-60 (2004) 
(arguing that throughout the Cold War a liberalism of fear underwrote U.S. government moralism 
and violence abroad even as it underwrote minimalism and caution at home). 
193 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
194 Ben Wasike, FoIA in the Age of “Open.Gov”: An Analysis of the Performance of the Freedom of 
Information Act Under the Obama and Bush Administrations, 33 GOV’T INFO. Q. 417, 418 (2016). Similar 
dynamics recur abroad. For a catalog of “informal methods of resistance” to FOI laws observed in 
Commonwealth bureaucracies, see Alasdair Roberts, Dashed Expectations: Governmental Adaptation 
to Transparency Rules, in TRANSPARENCY: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 107, 111-18 
(Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 2006) (capitalization omitted). 
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premise that generally reasonable and well-intentioned public servants see 
FOIA as a serious hindrance to their statutorily assigned work. FOIA avoidance 
and aversion, on this premise, are not necessarily markers of crookedness so 
much as of the tension between the strictures of the Act and the demands of 
bureaucratic rationality. Exactly what to make of administrative resistance to any 
given law is a complicated, context-sensitive question. The fact that the latter 
interpretation never even seems to occur to most commentators suggests that, 
on top of the other burdens identified above, FOIA has been generating 
antigovernmental ideological costs for agencies and their personnel. 
Once more, it is important to recall that FOIA is but one of many models 
for securing “open” government, as these implications may not generalize across 
the full set. Other transparency strategies, such as affirmative disclosure, ought 
to impose fewer practical and pecuniary burdens on agencies because they are 
not request-driven. They ought to impose fewer ideological costs because they 
are not fear-driven. 
2. Representations of Government 
“I often describe the handling of my FOIA request as the single most 
disillusioning experience of my life.” 
— anonymous twenty-six-year-old freelance journalist, 2016195 
 
Compounding the foregoing concerns, FOIA helps to shape public 
perceptions of government through several more direct channels: journalism 
that relies on records obtained through FOIA, journalism about the Act itself, 
and ordinary citizens’ experience of the requesting process. These channels 
collectively generate a relentless, and distorted, narrative of bureaucratic failure. 
Arguments about FOIA’s democratic value emphasize above all else its 
contributions to investigative reporting.196 Although the news media account for 
only a small fraction of total requests—six percent, according to a generous 
estimate from 2005197—FOIA has played some part in hundreds of stories over 
 
195 FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 7, at ii. 
196 See, e.g., Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1371 (“FOIA was . . . designed largely by 
journalists, for journalists, and with the particular goal in mind that journalists would use access to 
government information to provide knowledge to the public . . . .”). 
197 Frequent Filers, supra note 34; see also id. (finding that “[n]onprofit groups” file three percent 
of all FOIA requests). The six percent estimate is generous because there was “a spike in journalistic 
activity” during the period under consideration (September 2005) on account of Hurricane Katrina 
and because the study considered only Cabinet departments and “large” agencies, which may tend to 
attract a disproportionate share of media requesters. Id. The media’s use of FOIA, moreover, fell off 
steeply after 2005 as the newspaper industry contracted. See JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY’S 
DETECTIVES: THE ECONOMICS OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 168-70 (2016). Journalists 
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the decades.198 Content analysis demonstrates several dominant motifs in this 
reporting. Professors Bruce Cain, Patrick Egan, and Sergio Fabbrini examined 
newspaper stories referencing FOIA from October 1999 to September 2000 and 
found that the largest share (twenty-five percent) “deal with wrongdoing, 
embarrassing information, and administrative incompetence” and that the “most 
popular type” of FOIA story in the United States, as in France, “focuse[s] on 
the exposure of bad management or the abuse of public money.”199 Consistent 
with these results, Professor James Hamilton examined stories submitted for an 
investigative reporting prize over the past several decades and found that, among 
those that utilized a state or federal FOI law, the largest share (over twenty-five 
percent) featured claims of misconduct, harassment, or waste.200 In a more 
impressionistic vein, Professor Alasdair Roberts has observed that “the sort of 
news that is generated by [a FOI law] is unlikely to be flattering to government,” 
with an emphasis on “internal bureaucratic conflicts or mismanagement, or 
contradictions between actual and professed policy.”201 
Government misconduct and mismanagement are serious matters, of course, 
and this brand of FOIA-facilitated journalism has generated meaningful forms 
of political deliberation and accountability. That said, there are many strategies 
for rooting out misconduct and mismanagement, and there is good cause to 
believe that such journalism systematically overrepresents the severity of the 
problem—and not merely because of the media’s appetite for scandal. One 
reason is that FOIA applies only to government agencies, which raises the 
 
account for a similarly small fraction of FOI requests at the state level. See Katherine Fink, State FOI 
Laws: More Journalist-Friendly, or Less?, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 93. 
198 One should be skeptical of the “greatest hits” mode of argument frequently found in FOIA 
commentary, in which the Act is lauded on the basis of a small set of stories it helped make possible. 
But some researchers have looked into the matter more dispassionately and reported significant results. 
See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 157 (finding that approximately fourteen percent of news stories 
submitted for an Investigative Reporters & Editors award in recent years have involved a request for 
government documents through the federal FOIA or a state open records law); Bruce E. Cain et al., 
Towards More Open Democracies: The Expansion of Freedom of Information Laws, in DEMOCRACY 
TRANSFORMED? EXPANDING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL 
DEMOCRACIES 115, 135 (Bruce E. Cain et al. eds., 2003) (finding that stories referencing FOIA 
appeared roughly three times per week across four of the largest U.S. newspapers from October 1999 
to September 2000). The Sunshine in Government Initiative has collected over 700 stories that make 
use of FOIA in an online database. The “FOIA Files,” SUNSHINE IN GOV’T INITIATIVE (2017), 
http://sunshineingovernment.org/wordpress/the-foia-files [https://perma.cc/5MPC-YQJD]. 
199 Cain et al., supra note 198, at 136. 
200 See HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 157-58 (“The top three findings in terms of percentage of 
investigations involving government records requests were sexual harassment, misconduct, and waste.”). 
201 Roberts, supra note 194, at 119; see also Worthy, supra note 190, at 570 (remarking that 
“[h]igh-profile FOI stories” in the United Kingdom have “frequently featured . . . apparent smoking 
guns or evidence of inconsistency, poor behavior, or failure”). 
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relative cost of reporting on nongovernmental actors.202 The public sector 
becomes the public face of organizational incompetence and venality. 
A subtler reason is that the Act applies only to “records,” and federal 
employees are obligated under a separate set of laws to report waste, fraud, and 
abuse whenever these are observed.203 None of FOIA’s exemptions is designed 
to shield such conduct. Unlike many other agency activities, incidents of waste, 
fraud, and abuse thus produce a steady flow of requestable records, which 
become sitting ducks for media outlets. The fixation on government 
impropriety that characterizes FOIA stories is not an inevitable entailment of 
investigative journalism; it is partly an artifact of the Act’s idiosyncratic design. 
After stories about waste, fraud, and abuse, a second major category of 
stories that reference FOIA focuses on the alleged failings of the Act itself. The 
robustness of this genre becomes less surprising when one considers that FOIA 
is a machine built to fail. As explained above, FOIA’s promise of full agency 
disclosure and the rhetorical sacralization that attends this promise are belied not 
only by bureaucratic resistance, but also by the Act’s broadly framed exemptions 
and judicial deference to the executive.204 Even if no records are ultimately 
withheld, FOIA’s stringent disclosure deadline—currently twenty days, with one 
ten-day extension permitted in exceptional circumstances205—has never been 
realistic in light of compliance complexities and legislated funding levels. 
Agencies miss their time limits by months if not years,206 and the courts excuse 
these statutory violations.207 In addition to causing delays and denials, these 
practices socialize the journalists who use FOIA into an impersonal, adversarial, 
and seemingly lawless administrative culture. 
 
202 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text (discussing this feature of FOIA); see also 
HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 151 (explaining why corporations are often “hard targets” for investigative 
reporters); Mark Ames, Seymour Hersh and the Dangers of Corporate Muckraking, PANDO (May 28, 2015), 
https://pando.com/2015/05/28/seymour-hersh-and-the-dangers-of-corporate-muckraking [https://perma
.cc/4WH8-D86P] (describing and critiquing the “trend in muckraking journalism over the past few 
decades, away from fighting private corporate power, in favor of fighting government power”). 
203 See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11) (2015) (requiring all federal employees to “disclose 
waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities”). 
204 See supra notes 5–19 and accompanying text; subsections II.A.2–B.1. 
205 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (2012). 
206 See, e.g., COAL. OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOV’T, STILL WAITING AFTER ALL THESE 
YEARS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF FOIA PERFORMANCE FROM 1998 TO 2006, at 3 (2007) 
(finding that only one of the twenty-six agencies under consideration, the General Services 
Administration, was “able to consistently meet the statutory deadline for FOIA responses to 
complex requests”); see also FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 7, at 34 (stating that the “biggest barrier 
of all” experienced by FOIA users is “delay, delay, delay” (capitalization omitted)). 
207 See 1 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 7:30 (explaining that, even after Congress seemed to crack 
down on delays in its 1996 amendments, “relatively few cases have held agencies strictly to the 
statutory period”). 
1134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1097 
A journalism of disenchantment follows. ProPublica recently devoted a 
feature to its reporters’ “most frustrating public record failures.”208 
Notwithstanding that FOIA “was designed to give the public the right to 
scrutinize the records of government agencies,” the feature inveighs, “almost 
every reporter on our staff can recite aneurysm-inducing tales of protracted 
jousting with the public records offices of government agencies,” as “[l]ocal, state 
and federal agencies alike routinely blow through deadlines laid out in law or 
bend them to ludicrous degrees.”209 These tales are told and retold as FOIA 
folklore. The Act “has been a disappointment to journalists” virtually from the 
day it was passed,210 and “editorial scorn routinely greets the failure of federal 
agencies to respond promptly and fully to FOIA requests.”211 “Nothing in the 
world makes my blood boil faster,” Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist David 
Barstow once wrote, “than the federal Freedom of Information Act.”212 With so 
many journalists left feeling frustrated, denied their legal due, and in want of 
leverage over the targeted agency as well as a story to file, the “brokenness” of 
FOIA frequently becomes the story.213 
The thousands upon thousands of ordinary citizens who submit FOIA 
requests experience similar frustrations. Members of the mainstream media 
tend to be repeat players, at least, with the capacity to push back against 
agencies and a clear statutory entitlement to fee waivers.214 Little wonder, 
then, that members of the general public regard the FOIA process as 
unreasonably slow and “desperately wrong.”215 The same holds true at the state 
level. In a 2007 report on “FOI responsiveness” by the Better Government 
 




210 Carroll, supra note 53, at 195. 
211 Richard A. Guida, The Costs of Free Information, 97 PUB. INT. 87, 87 (1989). 
212 David T. Barstow, The Freedom of Information Act and the Press: Obstruction or Transparency?, 
77 SOC. RES. 805, 805 (2010). 
213 This pattern also recurs abroad. As Roberts astutely notes of FOI laws in Anglo-American 
democracies, “journalists and advocacy groups will learn that the filing of an [sic] FOIA request is 
itself an event around which a news story can be constructed; similarly a failure to provide 
information within a statutory deadline, or an outright denial of information . . . are all pretexts for 
further news coverage.” Roberts, supra note 194, at 120. 
214 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (2012) (prescribing reduced fees for “representative[s] 
of the news media”). But cf. FRANKLIN, supra note 58, at 511 (explaining that FOIA’s fee waiver 
scheme has been “a significant source of friction between the media and government agencies”). 
215 FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 7, at 38; see also id. at ii (“First-time or infrequent requesters 
. . . shared the most disheartening responses. Novice FOIA requesters were unprepared for the delay 
tactics and other obstacles to obtaining the information they were seeking.”); Carroll, supra note 53, 
at 195 (noting “the near-universal agreement that FOIA is dysfunctional”). 
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Association and the National Freedom of Information Coalition, thirty-eight 
states were given a grade of F and ten states a C or D.216 
FOIA, accordingly, conveys negative messages about government through 
a set of mutually reinforcing mechanisms. The disillusioning experiences of 
users are validated and amplified both in media stories that deplore the Act’s 
implementation and in stories that draw on released records to spotlight the 
bureaucracy’s worst moments. The FOIA process performs the very sort of 
government dysfunction that the Act is then enlisted to expose. If one wished 
to design a transparency policy that would sow rampant cynicism and 
animosity toward the administrative state, it would be hard to do much better. 
The ultimate consequences of these dynamics, it must be said, are hard to 
pin down. Measures of trust in government declined in the United States and 
other countries following the adoption of FOI laws.217 Yet while there is some 
modest empirical evidence218 and a burgeoning critical literature from abroad219 
to suggest a connection, causality would be all but impossible to prove given 
(among other things) the complex determinants of trust.220 At a minimum, the 
claims made by many around the time of FOIA’s enactment that the Act would 
secure “confidence in government”221 look exceedingly naïve in light of 
subsequent developments. More specifically, this Section has shown how FOIA 
enables a political discourse and ideology of antigovernmentalism that 
continually challenge the notion of an administrative state capable of 
addressing social problems. In an essay titled The Tyranny of Transparency, the 
British anthropologist Marilyn Strathern once urged readers to ask, “What 
 
216 Charles Davis, Report: Grading the United States on FOIA Responsiveness, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N 
(Nov. 1, 2008), http://www.bettergov.org/news/report-grading-the-united-states-on-foia-responsiveness 
[https://perma.cc/7YM6-7JMQ]. No state received an A grade. Id. 
217 See Worthy, supra note 190, at 575. 
218 See, e.g., id. at 576 (reporting that in a 2008 survey of UK FOI requesters, only three percent 
“felt FOI increased trust in government” whereas forty percent felt “it had decreased their trust”); 
see also id. at 575 (summarizing qualitative studies of Canada’s and New Zealand’s FOI laws that 
suggest a negative effect on trust). 
219 See TERO ERKKILÄ, GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY: IMPACTS AND UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 25 (2012) (arguing that access-to-information policies can have paradoxical effects 
on political accountability and trust in government insofar as they “build[] on the idea of conflict in 
state–citizen relations”); ONORA O’NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST 61-80 (2002) (suggesting that 
growing demands for institutional transparency have damaged trust and promoted a “culture of 
suspicion”); Hans Krause Hansen & Mikkel Flyverbom, The Politics of Transparency and the 
Calibration of Knowledge in the Digital Age, 22 ORGANIZATION 872, 875 (2015) (reviewing a range of 
“critical studies [that] have argued that transparency, usually promoted as a trust-enhancing measure, 
can spur mistrust”). 
220 See Roberts, supra note 194, at 119 (“[D]eterminants of trust are multifarious.”). 
221 Victor H. Kramer & David B. Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49, 
49 (1974) (“[FOIA] ranks with the Bill of Rights as a basis for the preservation of citizen’s confidence 
in government . . . .”); see also 3 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 24:13 (“FOIA was sponsored with the 
ideal of public requests and greater trust in government when openness had been achieved.”). 
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does visibility conceal?”222 The simple yet profound answer, in FOIA’s case, is 
a bureaucracy that basically works pretty well.223 
Once more, other transparency strategies may not have these same 
implications, at least not to the same degree. Affirmative disclosure requirements, 
for instance, have not generated such contemptuous media coverage or escalating 
cycles of cynicism where they have been tried. Whistleblowers can be channeled 
to inspectors general and congressional committees in advance of the press. 
“Leaks” can expose the inner workings of the crusading state while also, in 
many cases, serving the policy goals of senior officials.224 Conditioning legal 
effect on prior publication leaves ample space for deliberation and negotiation. 
And each of these alternative approaches is apt to involve less litigation and 
administrative burden. The United States’ enormous practical and symbolic 
investments in FOIA since 1966 have not only impeded federal agencies in the 
above-described ways, but have also impeded our ability to see what a costly, 
commercial, and limited version of transparency the Act supplies. 
III. COMPLICATIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS 
We now have in place all of the building blocks for a radical reassessment 
of FOIA: not the standard suggestion that the Act needs refinement on this or 
that margin to achieve its full potential, but rather the much starker proposition 
that its request-driven strategy may be flawed beyond repair. More empirical 
work is needed to substantiate several of the hypotheses outlined above. Yet, as 
I have tried to show, many of the interlocking arguments that support such a 
“radical” critique are already reasonably well-supported in theory and in fact. 
Taken together, I submit, these arguments raise serious doubts about the 
wisdom of FOIA from virtually any normative perspective—perhaps fatal 
doubts from certain left-liberal or efficiency-oriented perspectives. They ought 
to shift the burden to any supporter of FOIA who favors a vigorous 
administrative state to explain how those commitments can be reconciled. 
Many readers may be keen to object at this point that even if the concerns 
raised in Part II are more or less valid, surely FOIA remains a structural 
necessity (or at least an important safeguard) in a real democracy on account 
of the other public values that it serves and the distinctive manner in which 
it serves them. I cannot take up every such objection in this Article, the main 
 
222 Marilyn Strathern, The Tyranny of Transparency, 26 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 309, 310 (2000). 
223 See generally CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE NEW CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY (2015) 
(arguing based on a wide variety of evidence that U.S. public bureaucracies are among the best in 
the world and far more effective, efficient, and free of corruption than is commonly assumed). 
224 See Pozen, Leaky Leviathan, supra note 67, at 515 (arguing that “the executive’s toleration 
of” anonymous disclosures of confidential information to the press “is a rational, power-enhancing 
strategy and not simply a product of prosecutorial limitations”). 
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goal of which is to introduce a revisionist account. But in this Part, I will aim 
to address, succinctly, what I see as the three strongest counterarguments to 
the claim that FOIA tends to degrade progressive features of state and society 
while contributing less to democratic flourishing than is generally assumed. 
A. Due Process Interests 
The classic justifications for FOI laws emphasize values already touched 
upon, such as accountability, anti-abuse, and an informed electorate. In 
American practice, FOIA has evolved to serve a distinct function in protecting 
the due process interests of certain groups. Most strikingly, tens of thousands 
of noncitizens facing removal or other immigration proceedings have filed 
FOIA requests in recent years to obtain the government’s case file (or “A-File”) 
on them.225 Lacking an administrative discovery mechanism with which to 
access this information,226 these individuals and their lawyers turn to FOIA as 
a workaround. Additional groups that have enlisted FOIA to obtain personal 
files in support of possible legal claims include prisoners seeking their 
presentence reports227 and military veterans and Social Security recipients 
seeking records relating to their benefits.228 These uses of FOIA, as Professor 
Kwoka has suggested, “arguably produce the public good of fairer . . . hearings 
and more accurate outcomes”229—or, in other words, due process benefits. 
Beyond these discrete individual-rights contexts, the predominance of 
commercial requesters might also be defended on due process grounds.230 If 
businesses are especially likely to be targeted by the regulatory and 
enforcement efforts of a given federal agency—as one would expect in areas 
ranging from securities law to environmental law to consumer protection—then 
it makes sense that businesses would be especially eager to learn about the 
agency’s doings. They have the greatest need for notice and an opportunity to 
be heard before the law is interpreted or implemented by the agency to their 
disadvantage. Viewed through this lens, FOIA supports not only public 
knowledge about government in general, but also a more specific due process 
 
225 For discussions of this development, see Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. 
L. REV. 1803, 1843 n.272 (2013); and Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own 
Path, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 537-41 (2011). 
226 See Regina Germain, Putting the “Form” in Immigration Court Reform, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 
1145, 1146 (2007) (“What might appear most disturbing to an attorney coming to immigration court 
from a different area of practice is that even when there are rules, what is noticeably absent from 
them are some of the most common areas covered by civil rules of procedure and rules of evidence 
in other courts. For example, there are very limited rules of discovery.”). 
227 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (upholding this practice). 
228 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
229 Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 33, at 1421 n.412. 
230 I thank Fred Schauer for pressing me on this point. 
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interest on the part of those subject to coercive state action in knowing as much 
as feasible about the contours of that action. And because it is well-settled that 
procedural due process rights attach to adjudicative proceedings but not to 
quasi-legislative ones,231 we can see FOIA as a tool for bridging the 
adjudication–rulemaking gap in due process doctrine. 
These lines of argument caution against too-easy hand-wringing about 
FOIA’s regressive elements or the large volume of commercial requesters. But 
they do not, in the end, supply compelling justifications for FOIA. Rather, 
they supply compelling justifications for the affordance of due process 
protections in various administrative settings. FOIA itself is ill-suited to the 
task. Noncitizens facing removal, for instance, may well find that the FOIA 
process is so slow as to be of little use232 or that certain important documents, 
such as interview notes from an initial asylum interview, are not attainable 
under the Act.233 Whatever due process interests businesses may have in 
learning about agencies are likewise hampered by FOIA’s intractable delays, 
as well as by its processing fees and default norm of nondisclosure. At least 
in scenarios where coercive state action is threatened, an affirmative disclosure 
regime—with the burden on the government to supply relevant information 
to relevant parties in advance—could promote due process values more fully 
and efficiently than a request-driven approach. 
FOIA, in short, is not a satisfying solution but an ersatz band-aid for 
various procedural deficits generated by the modern administrative state. 
Where we find FOIA doing due process work, we find due process interests 
being served poorly. These emergent uses of the Act do not redeem the FOIA 
strategy, although they may point to holes in the legal fabric that deserve 
more meaningful mending. 
B. Investigative Reporting and Fire Alarm Oversight 
The strongest arguments for FOIA, in my view, center on its ability to 
assist investigative reporting and, through this reporting, fire alarm oversight 
by members of Congress.234 Even if journalists love to hate FOIA, they have 
relied on the Act and its state-level analogues to clarify, corroborate, and 
deepen their work on hundreds of significant stories about problematic agency 
behaviors.235 Records obtained through FOI laws have proven especially useful 
 
231 See Kagan, supra note 38, at 2362. 
232 See Traum, supra note 225, at 540 & n.299. 
233 See Larry R. Fleurantin, Immigration Law: Nowhere to Turn—Illegal Aliens Cannot Use the 
Freedom of Information Act as a Discovery Tool to Fight Unfair Removal Hearings, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 155, 165-66 (2008). 
234 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (discussing FOIA’s relation to fire alarm oversight). 
235 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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to newspapers with medium-sized circulations236 and to journalists pursuing 
longer-term projects.237 Their stories, in turn, have led to numerous hearings, 
audits, resignations, reassignments, and reform discussions.238 
One of FOIA’s seemingly odd characteristics—that the release of records 
to a specific requester has not been paired with release of those same records 
to the public at large—looks more defensible in light of investigators’ 
incentives. Journalists, researchers, and advocates who go through the hassle 
of the FOIA process have been receiving a temporary, quasi-proprietary 
interest in the documents they obtain, which encourages them to submit 
requests and to write up articles based on what they find.239 In line with these 
incentives, some “scoop-conscious journalists have panned” recent proposals 
to move toward a “release to one, release to all” model.240 They fear, not 
implausibly, that this move would disintermediate them and in so doing 
compromise the intelligibility of administrative action.241 FOIA’s 
longstanding failure to ensure full dissemination of records may have 
enhanced public comprehension of certain subjects, even if it has limited the 
overall volume of information in the public domain.242 
Notwithstanding these points, FOIA has always been a mixed blessing for 
American journalists, and in recent years the Act has become increasingly 
marginal to their craft. As already discussed, FOIA exacerbates the media’s 
tendency to fixate on governmental actors rather than nongovernmental 
 
236 See HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 155 (finding that, in investigative reporting prize entries, 
references to FOI requests were most common “among newspapers with medium circulations, 
consistent with [the assumption] that these newspapers use documents as a way to differentiate 
themselves from larger newspapers, which are more likely to have direct access to policymakers”). 
Hamilton’s recently published book contains by far the richest empirical study I have seen of how 
journalists use state and federal FOI laws. 
237 See id. at 160; COAL. OF JOURNALISTS FOR OPEN GOV’T, supra note 206. 
238 See HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 160. 
239 Cf. Tai, supra note 10, at 463 (“Some requesters will only find it worth requesting documents 
if they can retain exclusive possession of them, at least for a time. Many journalists undoubtedly 
have this motivation . . . .”). 
240 John Dyer, Fifty Years of FOIA, NIEMAN REP., Winter 2016, at 36, 45 (capitalization omitted). 
241 To mitigate this concern, a variant on the “release to one, release to all” policy could give the 
requester an exclusive window of, say, a week or two before the records she has received are released 
to the general public. See REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SURVEY OF 
JOURNALISTS’ VIEWS ON “RELEASE TO ONE, RELEASE TO ALL” UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION ACT 4 (2016) (finding in an online survey of 107 journalists that a majority would 
support the policy “only with conditions, such as a delay in the public release”). Near the end of the 
Obama Administration, DOJ requested public comment on a draft version of this policy that 
expressly held open the possibility of incorporating such a delay. See Request for Public Comment on 
Draft “Release to One, Release to All” Presumption, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,023 (Dec. 9, 2016). 
242 Put differently, FOIA may have helped increase the ratio of useful information to “noise” 
in the public sphere. Cf. Schauer, supra note 92, at 1344-45 (distinguishing knowledge from 
transparency and emphasizing that the latter “is, at best, a facilitator of knowledge”). 
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actors and on scandalous failures rather than instructive successes.243 Beyond 
the realm of in-depth investigative reporting, many forms of journalism are 
barely supported by FOIA. Journalists who work on tight deadlines, cover 
national security or foreign policy subjects, or lack personal familiarity with 
a particular agency or the institutional resources to litigate denials complain 
that the Act is too sluggish, too difficult to navigate, and too limited in its 
substantive scope to be of much use.244 Anecdotes abound of government 
officials fending off uncomfortable inquiries by telling the reporter to go file 
a FOIA request or by pointing to a FOIA exemption—reproducing the 
culture of “access journalism” that the Act was supposed to erode and leading 
some journalism scholars to wonder whether the industry would be “‘better 
off without a law at all.’”245 Functionally, the industry has been heading in this 
direction. Newspaper reporters have long been FOIA’s key constituency 
within the profession, and as newspaper sales and staffs have dwindled over 
the past decade, the overall volume of media requests has fallen off sharply.246 
In response to these developments, some have suggested that FOIA be 
revised to “preference the press.”247 FOIA, however, already preferences the 
press: both by limiting fees to “reasonable standard charges for document 
duplication” when the requester is from the news media (or “an educational or 
non-commercial scientific institution”),248 and by providing for expedited 
processing of requests “made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating 
information.”249 Critics point out that even when expedited processing is 
granted, FOIA remains far too slow and unreliable to serve most media 
needs.250 Yet while media requesters could be prioritized more aggressively at 
the expense of nonmedia requesters,251 FOIA’s deadlines cannot realistically 
 
243 See supra subsection II.B.2. 
244 See, e.g., FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 7, at ii (“Members of the media described their 
complete abandonment of the FOIA request as a tool because delays and redactions made the 
request process wholly useless for reporting to the public.”); Rachel Bunn, Fossil FOIA Requests: At 
Least One Records Request Goes Back 20 Years . . . and Counting, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 2012, at 
26 (“For some, especially journalists, the time spent waiting for information requested through 
FOIA can render the information almost useless.”); Carroll, supra note 53, at 215 (remarking that 
even if agencies were to comply with the statutory response deadlines, the wait time would still be 
“a journalistic eternity”); Derigan Silver, The News Media and the FOIA, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 493, 
494 (2016) (stating that “FOIA is failing journalists for many reasons,” including “long delays,” 
“processing inefficiencies,” and crowding out by nonmedia requesters). 
245 Dyer, supra note 240, at 40 (quoting Professor David Cuillier). 
246 See HAMILTON, supra note 197, at 168 (finding that media outlets submitted over twenty-five 
percent more FOIA requests to a sample of fourteen federal agencies in 2005 than they did in 2010). 
247 Carroll, supra note 53, passim. 
248 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (2012). Other requesters may be required to pay search and 
review charges on top of document duplication charges. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I), (III). 
249 Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i), (v)(II). 
250 See Carroll, supra note 53, at 226-29. 
251 For a cogent proposal, see id. at 234-43. 
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be brought in line with journalists’ deadlines given the challenges involved in 
searching for and reviewing responsive records and then applying the Act’s 
exemptions.252 FOIA’s radically decentralized model of disclosure is inherently 
labor-intensive and hence inherently time-consuming. A greatly enhanced 
press preference, furthermore, would only increase FOIA’s already substantial 
costs for the administrative state;253 compound concerns about defining “the 
news media” in an age of ubiquitous blogging; and contravene deep-seated 
norms, embodied in FOIA’s “any person” standard, of treating ordinary 
citizen-investigators at least roughly the same as professional investigators. 
Congressional reliance on FOIA to support its oversight work has been a 
mixed blessing as well. Recent scholarship furnishes some evidence that 
agencies that are more responsive to FOIA requests tend to be less responsive 
to congressional requests for documents, suggesting a possible tradeoff 
between police patrol and fire alarm monitoring in this context.254 More 
generally, although FOIA was developed in part to enable Congress to obtain 
executive branch information,255 “the project was soon subsumed into a wider 
discourse of civil rights, and redefined itself within a framework of the 
(individual) citizen’s relationship to the state.”256 The idea that FOIA’s 
function is to safeguard legislative supremacy is entirely absent from most 
contemporary commentary on the Act. If one believes, as most constitutional 
scholars do, that Congress has expansive authority to demand executive 
branch information that may be relevant to its legislative duties,257 then the 
Vietnam-era turn to “citizen suits” and the indirect FOIA route—at the 
height of the executive’s credibility gap and Congress’s commitment to 
imposing statutory constraints258—may be an instance in which Congress 
“underplayed its constitutional hand and undercut its own aims.”259 
 
252 See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text. 
253 So, too, with any proposal to increase attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs, allow for the 
recovery of monetary damages, or strengthen FOIA’s sanctions provision. 
254 See Abby K. Wood & David E. Lewis, Agency Performance Challenges and Agency 
Politicization (May 31, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884392 [https://perma
.cc/63VM-46VA]. 
255 See, e.g., Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, supra note 49, at 118 (stating that FOIA was 
intended to “help Congress reconstruct its lost authority over the overgrown administrative, national 
security state, empowering it to carry out its oversight tasks more effectively”). 
256 Colin Darch & Peter G. Underwood, Freedom of Information Legislation, State Compliance and 
the Discourse of Knowledge: The South African Experience, 37 INT’L INFO. & LIBR. REV. 77, 78 (2005). 
257 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 785 (“[T]he proposition that a legislative body generally possesses 
investigative powers is not controversial as a historical matter. Legislative investigative power is 
almost as old as legislative institutions themselves.”). 
258 See supra text accompanying note 138. 
259 Chafetz, supra note 71, at 739; see also supra notes 134–145 and accompanying text (developing 
this argument with regard to Congress’s failure to regulate the classification system). 
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As the volume of media requests has declined, moreover, FOIA’s continuing 
utility as a fire alarm trigger has been called into question. It is telling that in the 
Congressional Record of the 113th Congress, FOIA appears only a handful of 
times in conjunction with a new call for legislative action or a new complaint about 
substantive misconduct260—a fraction of the times that congresspersons invoked 
FOIA to complain about the Act itself or its implementation.261 Many of the latter 
 
260 See 160 CONG. REC. H5788 (daily ed. June 26, 2014) (statement of Rep. Capps) (“Last 
year, a FOIA request revealed that at least 15 fracks have taken place in Federal waters off the coast 
of California during the last two decades . . . .”); 160 CONG. REC. H5226 (daily ed. June 10, 2014) 
(statement of Rep. Gingrey) (citing a FOIA request by Americans for Limited Government for the 
claim that “there are 35 employees at the Department of Transportation alone . . . who spend 100 
percent of their workday working on behalf of a union”); 160 CONG. REC. H1726 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 
2014) (statement of Rep. Speier) (“A deluge of sex crime reports [in the military] . . . have been 
revealed, thanks not to the military disclosing them, but to the Associated Press through FOIA 
requests.”); 159 CONG. REC. H7204 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2013) (statement of Rep. Capps) (calling 
attention to hydraulic fracturing operations disclosed through FOIA); 159 CONG. REC. E874 (daily 
ed. June 14, 2013) (statement of Rep. Grayson) (discussing “documents released pursuant to a FOIA 
request” allegedly showing, among other things, the involvement of the Department of Homeland 
Security “in monitoring peaceful, lawful protest activities”). This footnote provides what I believe 
is an exhaustive list of instances in which members of the 113th Congress referenced FOIA in floor 
debates as the source of a novel disclosure. This information was collected by searching for “FOIA” 
and “Freedom of Information” within the Congressional Record for the 113th Congress using the 
Query Builder function of the advanced search tool on Congress.gov. 
Republican legislators’ criticism of the Obama Administration in the wake of the 2012 Benghazi 
embassy attacks also relied in part on documents obtained through FOIA. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. 
H3281 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2014) (statement of Rep. Gohmert) (referencing a FOIA request by 
Judicial Watch in accusing the Administration of misleading the press). These FOIA requests did 
not stimulate new congressional inquiry in classic fire alarm fashion, but rather supplemented an 
ongoing investigation. 
261 See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S5656 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2014) (statement of Sen. Blunt) 
(criticizing the response time for a FOIA request concerning the number of applications submitted 
to an Affordable Care Act processing center); 160 CONG. REC. H1890 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2014) 
(statement of Rep. Issa) (calling on Congress to amend FOIA to meet its objective of openness); 
159 CONG. REC. S8704 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2013) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (commenting negatively 
on the Obama Administration’s handling of FOIA requests); 159 CONG. REC. S5739 (daily ed. July 
17, 2013) (statement of Sen. Vitter) (criticizing the EPA for “dragg[ing] its feet and frustrat[ing] a 
lot of legitimate FOIA requests”); 159 CONG. REC. S5485 (daily ed. June 27, 2013) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy) (“We in Congress . . . have much more work to do to help ensure that FOIA’s values 
of openness and accountability remain in place for future generations of Americans.”); 159 CONG. 
REC. H3925 (daily ed. June 19, 2013) (statement of Rep. Crawford) (asserting that the EPA 
improperly released through FOIA “the personal information of livestock and poultry producers to 
various environmental activist groups”); 159 CONG. REC. S4589 (daily ed. June 18, 2013) (statement 
of Sen. Grassley) (criticizing requesters’ lack of access to Medicare payments made to physicians 
and suppliers); 159 CONG. REC. H2771 (daily ed. May 17, 2013) (statement of Rep. Gohmert) 
(criticizing the Obama Administration for directing agencies to include union bosses in 
predecisional discussions exempt under FOIA); 159 CONG. REC. H2651 (daily ed. May 15, 2013) 
(statement of Rep. Perry) (asserting that the EPA waived fees associated with FOIA requests for 
left-wing groups but not for right-wing ones); 159 CONG. REC. H2611 (daily ed. May 15, 2013) 
(statement of Rep. Whitfield) (same); 159 CONG. REC. S1767 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2013) (statement 
of Sen. Vitter) (accusing the EPA and the Obama Administration of “produc[ing] a lot of pieces of 
paper under FOIA” but withholding meaningful content through excessive redaction). 
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invocations of FOIA are notably partisan in nature. Because FOIA is a machine 
built to fail,262 it gives opposition members of Congress a ready cudgel with 
which to bash the sitting administration and denounce executive lawlessness.263 
In sum, while FOIA has made significant contributions to investigative 
reporting and congressional oversight, the Act’s relationship with each has 
always been fraught and is increasingly fraying. To believe that these 
contributions justify all of the costs highlighted in Part II, one must not only 
place a high premium on accountability journalism but also believe that the 
contributions could not be replicated with other, less costly regulatory 
strategies. Again, FOIA is not the only game in town. Over the course of 
FOIA’s life, numerous other instruments of police patrol and fire alarm 
oversight have arisen or expanded, from reporting requirements264 to 
whistleblower protection statutes265 to qui tam proceedings266 to leaks of 
classified information267 to GAO audits268 to old-fashioned committee hearings 
and meetings.269 Within the federal bureaucracy, many offices of inspectors 
general and ombudspersons have arisen or expanded as well.270 All of these 
 
262 See supra notes 204–207 and accompanying text. 
263 For the most prominent recent example, see FOIA IS BROKEN, supra note 7, at 1, which 
accuses the Obama Administration of being “willfully blind to the condition of the FOIA process.” 
See also MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., SECRECY IN THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION, at iv (Comm. Print 2004) (endorsing the claim that Bush Administration 
policies were “not only sucking the spirit out of the FOIA, but shriveling its very heart” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
264 See Beermann, supra note 70, at 106 (“Reporting requirements are also an effective tool that 
Congress uses to exert control over the executive branch. In recent decades, the number and range 
of reporting requirements have increased exponentially . . . .”). 
265 See SHIMABUKURO ET AL., supra note 66, at 57-58 (collecting federal whistleblower and 
anti-retaliation laws, the vast majority of which were enacted after 1966). 
266 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS 
ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 7-8 (2009) (describing 1986 and 2009 amendments that 
“reinvigorated qui tam procedures” under the False Claims Act). In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the government’s fulfillment of a FOIA request precludes qui tam suits based on that 
information when the relator does not also have firsthand information about the fraud. Schindler 
Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401 (2011). FOIA thus competes with the qui 
tam antifraud strategy to some extent. 
267 See Pozen, Leaky Leviathan, supra note 67, passim (discussing the prevalence of such leaks, 
the robust tradition of tolerating them, and arguments “that the volume of classified information 
leaks has been increasing in recent years”). 
268 See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30349, GAO: GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AND GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 4-8 (2008) (reviewing the “expansion 
and extension of [GAO’s] authority and jurisdiction” (capitalization omitted)); see also id. at 11 (showing 
that while GAO’s budget level fluctuated in the mid-1990s, it rose steadily after fiscal year 1998). 
269 See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 34-37 (1990) (tracking the growth from 1961 to 1983 of congressional committee hearings 
and meetings devoted primarily to oversight). 
270 See ALISSA M. DOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT MANUAL 91 (2014) (explaining that offices of inspectors general, “whose origins date back 
to the mid-1970s, have been granted substantial independence and powers to combat waste, fraud, and 
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developments make it more realistic today than in 1966 that Congress and its 
allies in civil society could compel agencies to produce legally and politically 
significant information outside of the FOIA process. 
While shrinking, the media has been evolving in some complementary 
ways. The Obama Administration’s much-touted push to publish “high-value” 
datasets online,271 along with the contraction of the traditional news industry, 
helped encourage a range of innovative organizations and technologies that use 
these sorts of datasets to evaluate existing policies and engage with government 
bureaucracies.272 And even in a fully realized world of “open data,” there would 
still be a need for sophisticated intermediaries to translate all those terabytes of 
information into stories the public can understand.273 The “death of FOIA”274 
contemplated by certain open data visionaries would not kill off accountability 
journalism, although it may require some investigative reporters to develop new 
skills or sources. 
I do not mean to deny that FOIA has provided investigative reporters with 
a unique and valuable resource, not easily replaced. I certainly do not mean to 
endorse the techno-utopian vision of governance that underwrites parts of the 
open data movement.275 Even if all of the critiques raised in this Article were 
agreed to be both empirically accurate and normatively alarming, the best overall 
solution might still involve preserving or repurposing FOIA for journalists 
while shrinking its footprint elsewhere (for example, by substantially increasing 
 
abuse within . . . more than 70 federal agencies”); Fenster, supra note 46 (tracing the rise of ombudsperson 
offices, both of general jurisdiction and focused on “open government” specifically); Nadia Hilliard, 
Monitoring the U.S. Executive Branch Inside and Out: The Freedom of Information Act, Inspectors General, and 
the Paradoxes of Transparency, in TROUBLING TRANSPARENCY, supra note 93 (manuscript at 5) (“The 
Inspector General Act of 1978 led to the establishment of an army of IGs on the federal level . . . . 
[T]ogether, the federal IG system adds over 14,000 personnel to the ranks of the government.”). 
271 See generally Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009) (issuing an Open Government Directive). 
272 See generally Beth Simone Noveck, Re-Imagining Government Through Civic Media: Three 
Pathways to Institutional Innovation, in CIVIC MEDIA: TECHNOLOGY, DESIGN, PRACTICE 149 (Eric 
Gordon & Paul Mihailidis eds., 2016) (examining the role of “civic media” and “civic technologies” 
in contemporary “open government” practice). 
273 See Jonathan Stoneman, Does Open Data Need Journalism? 10 (Univ. of Oxford, Reuters Inst. for 
Study of Journalism, Working Paper, 2015) (reviewing examples of “smaller US papers” that have “produce[d] 
useful stories on the basis of Open Data” and suggesting that media uptake of such data is crucial). 
274 Beth Simone Noveck, Is Open Data the Death of FOIA?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 273 (2016). In this 
provocatively titled essay, Professor Noveck suggests that “open data would seem to be a natural 
evolution from, and improvement over, FOIA,” but ultimately concludes that the two regimes are 
better treated as “supplement[s] rather than . . . substitute[s].” Id. at 281. 
275 For a scathing critique of open-data policies in Canada, see Tom Slee, Why the “Open Data 
Movement” Is a Joke, WHIMSLEY (May 1, 2012), http://whimsley.typepad.com/whimsley/2012/05
/why-the-open-data-movement-is-a-joke.html [https://perma.cc/VS4X-4AR9]. For a rebuttal, see 
David Eaves, Open Data Movement Is a Joke?, EAVES.CA (May 2, 2012), https://eaves.ca/2012/05/02
/open-data-movement-is-a-joke [https://perma.cc/HEE2-Z9DP]. 
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fees for commercial requesters276). At least, some such intermediate solution 
may be preferred by readers who are troubled by FOIA’s downsides yet willing 
to accept a large burden on the administrative state for even a modest boost to 
investigative reporting. 
For readers who do not have such a strong a priori commitment to the late 
twentieth-century paradigm of accountability journalism, the end point of this 
Article’s critique is less clear. In a passage from his 2015 book, The Rise of the Right 
to Know, media sociologist Michael Schudson recalls a Pulitzer Prize–winning 
exposé enriched by a FOIA request and then pauses to consider: 
Would a hundred such stories a year justify all the expense and trouble of 
FOIA? Ten such stories? One? The question is rhetorical, but it can be 
tethered to dollars and cents when the actual costs of responding to FOIA 
requests are examined . . . . In fiscal year [2008], the federal government 
[shouldered] . . . a total cost of $338 million.277 
The true cost of FOIA, this Article has suggested, is far greater than the 
official monetary compliance figure; the number of major stories that could 
not have been written without FOIA has been steadily falling; and a host of 
alternative transparency strategies already support significant investigative 
journalism and could support much more if better funded and promoted by 
Congress, watchdog groups, and the media itself. Redirecting the FOIA 
budget toward new subsidies for the press might have an especially dramatic 
impact.278 Why should the question posed by Schudson be merely rhetorical? 
C. Antityranny and the Ecology of Transparency 
Finally, it is worth saying a few words about a suite of arguments advanced 
in what I take to be the canonical recent defense of FOIA. In an article 
examining FOIA in the context of the “Global War on Terror,” Professor Seth 
Kreimer ingeniously takes the standard criticisms of the Act and turns them 
on their head.279 The heavy use of FOIA by “special interests,” for example, is 
 
276 For a proposal to increase processing fees substantially for commercial requesters and 
modestly for other requesters, see Tai, supra note 10, at 483-88. 
277 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE 
CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945–1975, at 31-32 (2015). 
278 A variety of direct and indirect subsidies for investigative journalism have been proposed 
over the past decade in response to the newspaper industry’s decline. For a sampling of such 
proposals, see GEOFFREY COWAN & DAVID WESTPHAL, USC ANNENBERG CTR. ON COMMC’N 
LEADERSHIP & POL’Y, PUBLIC POLICY AND FUNDING THE NEWS (2010); Leonard Downie, Jr. & 
Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American Journalism, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
Nov./Dec. 2009, at 28, 45-50; and Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, A Public Press? Evaluating the 
Viability of Government Subsidies for the Newspaper Industry, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 197-98 (2012). 
279 Kreimer, supra note 89, passim. Kreimer’s article also makes a number of descriptive and 
analytic contributions. I focus here on the most novel, normative elements. 
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said by Kreimer to supply a valuable hedge against political retrenchment.280 
(Kreimer might have added that private enforcement regimes, in general, are 
sometimes said to guard against bureaucratic and policy drift.281) The 
processing delays and protracted litigation that characterize requests about 
sensitive policies can enable a salutary form of “[t]ime-shifted review.”282 Even 
when plaintiffs lose in challenges to the Act’s national security exemption, as 
they usually do, their actions may generate partial disclosures and stimulate 
other modes of transparency—for example, by emboldening a civil servant to 
leak or prompting Congress or the media to dig deeper.283 Regardless of 
whether FOIA looks like a deadbeat under conventional cost–benefit analysis, 
Kreimer insists, the Act nonetheless serves a critical democratic function in 
checking against “tyrannical or barbaric decisions and . . . catastrophic 
government failures.”284 
Kreimer is clearly correct to observe that laws like FOIA contribute to a 
larger “ecology of transparency” in ways we would miss if we focused too 
narrowly on their discrete outputs.285 This point alone is sufficient to counsel 
caution about radical reform. It does not necessarily follow from Kreimer’s 
observations, however, that the ecology of national security information 
would be impoverished if FOIA were curtailed and other transparency 
strategies were expanded in its stead. To show that FOIA interacts 
synergistically with certain other disclosure tools is not to show that FOIA is 
critical to those tools, which seems implausible in the case of leaking, 
whistleblowing, congressional scrutiny, and media scrutiny. Outside of the 
national security area, moreover, this Article has argued that FOIA 
contributes more significantly to other ecologies of transparency—regressive, 
antiregulatory ecologies that do meaningful damage to the administrative 
state and the prospects for effective governance. The political economy and 
political sociology of FOIA look very different with regard to domestic policy 
matters than with regard to national security matters. If we are moving the 
 
280 See id. at 1073 (“The broader the constituencies that benefit from a regime of transparency, 
the more likely that regime is to prove sustainable; where the ACLU and the Associated Press can stand 
with the Business Roundtable, they are more likely to resist predictable pressures to curtail FOIA.”). 
281 See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 5 (2010). 
282 Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1078. 
283 See id. at 1056-61. This can be seen as a variant on the “winning through losing” phenomenon 
explored in Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011). 
284 Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1074; see also id. at 1072 (“[FOIA’s] situation in a resilient ecology 
of transparency provides a failsafe mechanism adapted to the task of bringing the popular conscience 
to bear against tyranny and barbarism.”). 
285 Cf. Ben Worthy & Robert Hazell, Disruptive, Dynamic and Democratic? Ten Years of FOI in 
the UK, 70 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 22, 36 (2017) (suggesting that the UK FOI law is likewise “best 
seen as part of a wider political ecosystem of formal and informal mechanisms designed to scrutinise 
government and hold [it] accountable”). 
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analysis to the “ecological” level, we should not limit our view to one 
particular cluster of trees. 
I also have some doubts about Kreimer’s discrete arguments. It is not at 
all clear to me, for instance, that FOIA would be vulnerable to political 
retrenchment without so much commercial use, given the ideological fervor 
with which the law is now supported in the media and the general public. No 
congressperson wishes to be seen as “anti-freedom of information.” If time-
shifted review allows sensitive policies to be assessed in the more sober light 
of history, it also attenuates the watchdog accountability that lies at the heart 
of the FOIA project and allows some of those policies to become entrenched 
in the interim. Perhaps most importantly, the claim that FOIA checks against 
tyrannical and barbaric decisions is vulnerable on a number of levels. 
Historically, leaks appear to have done far more than FOIA to expose the 
underbelly of the national security state.286 Even when FOIA has been used 
to confirm abuses such as torture, as Kreimer acknowledges, “revelation has 
not been followed by repudiation” in all cases.287 As this Article was being 
drafted, the most authoritarian, pro-torture presidential candidate in memory 
was not being cowed by FOIA but rather energetically supporting its use to 
attack his general election opponent.288 
The relationship between FOIA and tyranny prevention is far from 
straightforward, then. Philosophically, Kreimer is operating solidly within a 
liberalism of fear in defending the Act on these grounds.289 Yet, especially when 
we move beyond the national security field where FOIA is weakest, why should 
 
286 Consider, for example, President Truman’s 1951 claim that “95 percent of our secret 
information” had been exposed through leaks, The President’s News Conference, 247 PUB. PAPERS 
254, 255 (Oct. 4, 1951), or Edward Snowden’s recent disclosures about NSA surveillance programs that 
had been FOIA-proof under Exemptions 1 and 3. Kreimer would presumably reject any dichotomy 
between leaks and FOIA and emphasize instead their productive relation—as reflected in the surge of 
FOIA requests to the NSA following Snowden’s revelations. See Jason Leopold, NSA Logs Reveal Flood 
of Post-Snowden FOIA Requests, AL JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/
2014/4/8/nsa-after-snowden.html [https://perma.cc/WK4K-BSGB]. Not all components of an ecosystem 
are equally important, however. The point remains that leaking, not FOIA, appears to be the alpha 
predator in the area of national security transparency. 
287 Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1015. 
288 See, e.g., Danielle Bernstein, RNC Requests Clinton E-Mails Through FOIA, BLOOMBERG: 
POL. (July 7, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/trackers/2016-07-07/rnc-requests-clinton-e 
-mails-through-foia [https://perma.cc/C598-XRXX] (discussing a Republican National Committee 
FOIA request seeking then–Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s emails from when 
she was Secretary of State). As President, Donald Trump’s own communications and those of his 
immediate advisers are not covered by FOIA. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
289 See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text (arguing that standard justifications for 
FOIA are premised on a liberalism of fear). In other writings, Kreimer has eloquently defended the 
“need to constrain the exercise of official violence” as the central concern of “a legitimate liberal 
polity.” Seth F. Kreimer, Rejecting “Uncontrolled Authority over the Body”: The Decencies of Civilized 
Conduct, the Past and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 446 (2007). 
1148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1097 
the specter of tyranny loom so large in our assessments of an administrative 
disclosure policy? As already discussed, FOIA has the greatest impact on 
domestic regulatory agencies; there is no evidence that these agencies are rife 
with villainy; and there are now many other mechanisms that guard against 
abuse. As a matter of principle, it is debatable whether repelling barbarism ought 
to be the touchstone of a general freedom of information law. As a matter of 
practice, it is debatable whether FOIA materially advances any such objective. 
Some of Kreimer’s key empirical and normative premises thus strike me as 
strained, although they deserve closer attention than I can give them in this 
Article. Even if we were to grant his points, though, just pause to consider that 
the single most sophisticated defense of FOIA in the literature is so creative 
and, often, so counterintuitive in its argumentation. Kreimer is grasping to find 
something redemptive about this super-statute in the national security context. 
His nuanced, highly qualified argument is worlds apart from the prevalent 
notion that FOIA is a bedrock of democracy and good government. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE PATHS 
This Article has suggested that FOIA not only fails to deliver on ostensible 
goals such as participatory policymaking, equal access to information, and full 
agency disclosure, but also has evolved to subvert some of these goals as well as 
other public law values. The Article has further suggested that if FOIA ever 
really was an indispensable instrument for generating executive branch 
transparency, it no longer is. Today’s information access landscape looks very 
different from the one that confronted FOIA’s framers. Even putting FOIA 
requests to the side, the proliferation of mass communication technologies, 
statutory reporting requirements, whistleblower protection laws, qui tam 
proceedings, GAO audits, external watchdog groups, internal oversight 
mechanisms, web-based open government initiatives, and leak culture has made 
the administrative state a substantially more visible and checked space than it 
was fifty years ago. At this point, “administrative agencies in the United States 
are some of the most extensively monitored government actors in the world.”290 
If these arguments have merit, then we ought to be considering how we can 
reduce reliance on FOIA’s request-and-respond paradigm while strengthening 
the role of alternative transparency models—at least to the extent that these 
models do not replicate the deficiencies and downsides of FOIA. There are 
many possible paths forward, several of which have already been mentioned in 
passing. Open government advocates might, for example, focus their efforts on 
 
290 Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency 
in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (2009). 
2017] Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act 1149 
obtaining new public subsidies for investigative journalism,291 new limitations 
on agencies’ ability to incorporate private industry standards by reference into 
their regulations,292 new protections for whistleblowers and public-motivated 
leakers,293 or new procedures for reining in the national security classification 
system294—where so many secrets reside outside FOIA’s grasp—and the system 
of prepublication review of statements and writings by former government 
employees.295 Established tools such as inspector general audits or GAO 
investigations could also, of course, be used more intensively. 
The most scalable approach (or family of approaches) to transparency 
policy, and the most plausible substitute for the traditional FOIA model, is 
affirmative disclosure. Rather than wait for a request for specific records to 
be filed, whole categories of records deemed appropriate for release can be 
posted online or otherwise published on a regular schedule.296 FOIA has 
always contained some limited provisions to this effect,297 but a stronger 
version of affirmative disclosure was the major road not taken when FOIA 
was enacted. As a constitutional matter, the Article III requirement that 
plaintiffs show a particularized “injury in fact” to establish standing298 means 
that an affirmative disclosure policy cannot rely on citizen suits to the same 
degree as a request-driven policy. And in 1966, the idea of creating broad new 
transparency requirements without private enforcement may have seemed 
unwise to members of Congress, given prevailing levels of interbranch 
 
291 See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. For discussion of reform options, see Nina A. 
Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private 
Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 799-807 (2014); and Strauss, supra note 64, at 529-61. 
293 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Recent reform proposals in the national security 
area include Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 
8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281 (2014); and Daniel D’Isidoro, Protecting Whistleblowers and Secrets in the 
Intelligence Community, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (Sept. 29, 2014, 9:01 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2014/09/
protecting-whistleblowers-and-secrets-in-the-intelligence-community [https://perma.cc/9DSB-YMJW]. 
294 See supra notes 125–130 and accompanying text. For illustrative reform proposals, see 
GOITEIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 33-49; and Aftergood, supra note 136, at 411-16. 
295 See, e.g., Kevin Casey, Note, Till Death Do Us Part: Prepublication Review in the Intelligence 
Community, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 417, 452-60 (2015); Jack Goldsmith & Oona A. Hathaway, The 
Government’s Prepublication Review Process Is Broken, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-governments-prepublication-review-process-is-broken/2015/12/25
/edd943a8-a349-11e5-b53d-972e2751f433_story [http://perma.cc/9DFB-H5XC]. But see Steven Aftergood, 
Fixing Pre-Publication Review: What Should Be Done?, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.justsec
urity.org/28827/fixing-pre-publication-review-done [https://perma.cc/6K39-M5NZ] (arguing that it would 
be more fruitful to “focus instead on classification reform”). 
296 See supra subsection I.B.1. 
297 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
298 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-85 
(2000); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-78 (1992). 
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distrust.299 A robust affirmative disclosure policy may have also seemed 
impractical, given the technical difficulty and expense of disseminating 
documents to the American people—who, for their part, were far less invested 
than today in the notion of a “right to know” what government is up to.300 
While popular demand for government openness has risen over the past 
five decades, the barriers to affirmative disclosure have fallen. Agency records 
have gone electronic. Websites with virtually unlimited storage capacity have 
replaced physical reading rooms as the locus of dissemination.301 And 
relatively independent offices that oversee administrative compliance have 
multiplied and matured within the federal bureaucracy.302 By the mid-1970s, 
the executive branch’s system for managing national security information, 
developed in parallel with FOIA, was already relying on an affirmative 
disclosure scheme for the “automatic declassification” of material deemed no 
longer sensitive, albeit with long time lags and large backlogs.303 
FOIA’s unheralded affirmative disclosure provisions have suffered from neglect 
at the hands of numerous agencies, as explained above.304 But in a variety of other 
contexts, affirmative disclosure of government-generated information has begun to 
come into its own. For example, the environmental impact statements required by 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 are widely seen as a central (if 
controversial) feature of environmental regulation in the United States and 
abroad.305 The New Mexico legislature mandated the creation in 2010 of a “single 
internet web site that is free, user-friendly, searchable and accessible to the public 
. . . to host the state’s financial information,” including operating budgets, revenue 
inflows, and contracts worth more than $20,000.306 Consistent with a series of 
 
299 See Robert L. Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of Freedom of Information 
Act Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2000) (asserting that FOIA “resulted” in part from 
Vietnam-War-inspired “distrust of government”); see also 1 O’REILLY, supra note 12, § 3:8 (stating 
that FOIA, as amended in 1974, “reflect[s] congressional distrust for agency withholding”). 
300 See SCHUDSON, supra note 277, at 30 (explaining, with reference to FOIA, that “American 
society in the past half century has adopted more demanding norms and more widespread and 
enforceable practices of public disclosure in government”). 
301 See, e.g., About Us, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/aboutProgram [https://
perma.cc/5V55-E7KJ] (explaining that since 2003, Regulations.gov has allowed users to search “all 
publicly available regulatory materials, e.g., posted public comments, supporting analyses, [Federal 
Register] notices, and rules”). 
302 See supra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing inspectors general and ombudspersons). 
303 Exec. Order No. 11,652, § 5, 3 C.F.R. 375, 380-82 (1973); see also Exec. Order No. 13,526, 
§ 3.3, 3 C.F.R. 298, 307-10 (2010) (prescribing the current rules for automatic declassification); 
GOITEIN & SHAPIRO, supra note 128, at 17-18 (discussing delays and backlogs). 
304 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
305 See SCHUDSON, supra note 277, at 180-227. 
306 Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Full Disclosure Back: A Call for 
Dismantling FOIA, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 515, 531 (2016) (quoting 80 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16D-
3(A)). This “sunshine portal” must be updated “as frequently as possible but at least monthly.” Id. 
(quoting 80 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-16D-3(D)). 
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executive branch initiatives to promote “open data,”307 the federal DATA Act of 
2014 requires the Treasury Department and the White House Office of 
Management and Budget to publish standardized spending information on the 
USASpending.gov website by May 2017.308 Building on these examples, one 
could imagine a future in which FOIA requests are phased out, at least with 
regard to records created after a certain date, in favor of a comprehensive 
affirmative disclosure regime. Congress recently instructed agency heads to 
establish “procedures for identifying records of general interest or use to the 
public that are appropriate for public disclosure, and for posting such records in 
a publicly accessible electronic format,”309 and commentators have increasingly 
expressed interest in “breaking out of the antiquated FOIA file-a-request 
approach” on both transparency and efficiency grounds.310 
As suggested by the story of FOIA’s own affirmative disclosure provisions, 
however, any such move would confront a number of significant challenges. 
First, the affirmative disclosure duties may suffer from inattention, narrow 
construction, or worse. Although compliance issues bedevil FOIA’s request 
system too,311 privately initiated lawsuits and news stories about those lawsuits 
provide some check against recalcitrant agencies. Second, owing to the limits 
of foresight and the transaction costs of delineating new access rights and 
responsibilities, drafters of an affirmative disclosure regime may find it hard to 
predict which sorts of information will be most relevant to future citizens, 
journalists, and legislators. One virtue of FOIA’s decentralized discovery model 
is that it minimizes the need for such predictions to be made and then reduced 
to statutory language; whatever records people come to crave, they can demand 
 
307 See supra notes 271–275 and accompanying text; see also Noveck, supra note 275, at 274-79 
(chronicling these initiatives). Since 2009, the central clearinghouse for open data from the federal executive 
branch has been Data.gov. See DATA.GOV, https://www.data.gov [https://perma.cc/TR4U-T5Q3]. 
308 Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 
Stat. 1146. For more details on the Act’s implementation, see DATA ACT, https://www.usaspending.gov
/Pages/data-act.aspx [https://perma.cc/HUX5-28ND]. 
309 FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, § 4, 130 Stat. 538, 544 (to be codified 
at 44 U.S.C. § 3102(2)). 
310 Gary D. Bass & Sean Moulton, Bringing the Web 2.0 Revolution to Government, in OPEN 
GOVERNMENT 289, 298 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma eds., 2010); see also id. (arguing in favor 
of “affirmative dissemination of nearly all government spending on an ongoing basis”); Melissa Guy 
& Melanie Oberlin, Assessing the Health of FOIA After 2000 Through the Lens of the National Security 
Archive and Federal Government Audits, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 331, 352 (2009) (asking whether “a 
sophisticated, searchable, central clearinghouse of government information [might] be more 
appropriate” than FOIA); Stewart & Davis, supra note 306, at 518 (characterizing FOIA’s reliance 
on requests as its “original sin” and urging its replacement with “proactive openness”); Vladeck, supra 
note 58, at 1789 (calling FOIA’s reliance on requests its “Achilles’ heel”). 
311 See supra notes 204–216 and accompanying text. 
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them.312 And third, a broad affirmative disclosure regime may produce so much 
information as to overwhelm outside audiences, ultimately degrading rather 
than enhancing media coverage and public comprehension of whatever is 
released. This “overload” critique has been forcefully leveled against laws 
mandating disclosure in the consumer context.313 Perhaps the critique would 
carry over to mandatory disclosures of agencies’ own information. 
On account of these challenges and the bureaucratic-capacity considerations 
identified in subsection II.B.1, any migration away from the traditional FOIA 
model and toward affirmative disclosure would need to be pursued cautiously. 
Privacy and deliberative concerns, for instance, may counsel against applying 
affirmative disclosure to certain inherently sensitive records, such as documents 
relating to an administrative adjudication of a disability claim, as well as to 
personal emails and predecisional materials. The challenges to making this 
migration are not necessarily insurmountable, however, and the case for 
affirmative disclosure of most material obtainable through FOIA remains 
compelling—indeed, more compelling than its advocates may have realized, 
given the political and distributional stakes highlighted in this Article. Although 
I cannot delve deeply into design issues here,314 let me close with some tentative 
suggestions to guide legislative reform in light of the criticisms advanced in Part 
II and the complications just noted. 
Nonjudicial enforcement. To minimize the risk of noncompliance while 
moving away from the citizen-suit model, Congress may wish to give a larger 
enforcement role to governmental actors such as ombudspersons and GAO 
analysts and to techniques such as audits and inspections. Routine monitoring 
of agencies’ disclosure practices could be reinforced with randomized reviews 
or with investigations triggered by a complaint process. Federalism offers 
guidance in this area, as many states have developed administrative strategies 
to enhance compliance with their open government laws.315 
FOIA filings as a (temporary?) safeguard and supplement. At least for an initial 
transition period, the decentralized FOIA system could remain in place to 
compensate for the limits of legislative drafting and to support the foregoing 
enforcement strategies—with requests allowed for records that fall outside of an 
 
312 While any given FOIA requester may face a problem of “prerequisite knowledge” in that 
she must know what documents to ask for, see Kreimer, supra note 89, at 1025-32, FOIA itself thus 
reduces the burden of prerequisite knowledge on legislative drafters and overseers. 
313 For the leading critique of such mandatory disclosure, see generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR 
& CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE (2014). For a trenchant response, see generally Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal 
Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015) (book review). 
314 For preliminary efforts to think through the practicalities of implementing a broader 
affirmative disclosure policy, see Fenster, supra note 129, at 941-49; Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 34, 
at 1429-36; and Stewart & Davis, supra note 306, at 528-36. 
315 See Fenster, supra note 46, at 281-90 (cataloging state enforcement mechanisms). 
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affirmative disclosure mandate or for the specific purpose of checking against 
affirmative disclosure’s misuse or underuse.316 An analogy might be drawn here to 
the “books and records” requests that stockholders may make under section 220 of 
the Delaware corporate code to ensure, among other things, a firm’s compliance 
with the securities laws and those laws’ disclosure obligations.317 Over time, 
depending on how affirmative disclosure is faring, FOIA requests for either or 
both of these purposes might be curtailed or eliminated. 
Standardization of disclosure methods. To reduce the risk of strategic disclosure 
behavior, Congress may wish to specify the timing and format as well as the 
substance of core publication requirements. Timing and formatting standards 
facilitate analysis and oversight. They can also make it harder for agencies to 
release material in a biased or opportunistic manner, so as to benefit certain political 
agendas or special interests,318 or in a manner designed to hide controversial items 
in a “flood” of information.319 
Facilitating search and navigation. To further manage the problem of information 
overload, Congress could push agencies to provide enhanced search and navigation 
tools in their electronic “reading rooms,”320 along with enhanced technical support 
for users. NARA, the National Science Foundation, or other government funding 
bodies might support research and pilot projects toward this end.321 More 
ambitiously, Congress could seek to leverage emerging interagency platforms such 
 
316 See Noveck, supra note 274, at 282 (“[W]here gaps exist in [an] open data regime, FOIA provides 
the legal right of action to fight for the data that government refuses to disclose when it should.”). 
317 See generally Stephen A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220 
Demands, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1595 (2005). These requests must be made for “a proper purpose” 
and may not amount to a “broad fishing expedition.” See id. at 1610-16, 1610 n.105 (reviewing case 
law on this point). 
318 Cf. Jo Bates, The Strategic Importance of Information Policy for the Contemporary Neoliberal State: 
The Case of Open Government Data in the United Kingdom, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 388, 394 (2014) (arguing 
that while open data initiatives may be enlisted to ameliorate “the trend towards proprietisation and 
commercialisation of information,” the evidence “suggests that the Open Government Data agenda is also 
being used strategically, and often insidiously, by the UK government to fuel a range of broader and more 
controversial policies”). U.S. agencies generally “cannot hide their decisions” through strategically timed 
disclosures, but “timing can be used to change the cost structure of the public and private interest groups 
who are in the business of monitoring them.” Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 290, at 1163. 
319 See generally Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755 (2015) 
(examining the phenomenon of “information flooding” in the consumer context). 
320 Such reading rooms already exist under FOIA. See DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 15, at 12. 
321 See, e.g., Columbia Univ. Global Pol’y Initiative, Archives Without Borders, http://global
policy.columbia.edu/projects/archives-without-borders [https://perma.cc/V3N6-KK4H] (describing an 
interdisciplinary project that develops new methods for storing, retrieving, and processing government 
data and “exploring extremely large document collections”). 
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as FOIAonline322 and USAspending.gov323 and mandate that disclosures be made 
accessible through a centralized online portal or set of portals. 
Learning from logs. While it can be hard to predict which sorts of records will 
be of greatest interest to people in the future, it is relatively easy to ascertain 
which sorts of records have been of greatest interest to requesters in the past. 
By studying their own FOIA logs, agency officials and their legislative and 
administrative overseers can identify categories of records that tend to be 
requested in bulk and to be released without detailed review for privacy or other 
exemption concerns—and that are therefore prime candidates for affirmative 
disclosure.324 As amended in 1996 and 2016, FOIA already requires that agencies 
engage in a version of this self-scrutiny.325 
Petitions, not requests. Because studying FOIA logs is a backward-looking 
enterprise, additional tools may be needed to identify and close holes in an 
affirmative disclosure mandate’s coverage, without falling back to the FOIA 
strategy of permitting limitless personal requests for information. Petitions 
provide an intermediate solution. Just as the Obama White House committed 
to review and respond to all petitions on policy issues that garnered a certain 
number of online signatures within thirty days,326 so too might agencies be 
required to address all qualifying petitions for disclosure of specific documents. 
Expanded incident reporting. Incident reporting offers yet another partially 
decentralized strategy for ensuring that significant developments trigger a public 
reckoning. In recent decades, government agencies in the United States and 
abroad have imposed incident reporting obligations on regulated firms to help 
identify, investigate, and respond to unforeseen (and perhaps unforeseeable) 
adverse events in fields ranging from aviation to drug development to nuclear 
 
322 FOIAONLINE, https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home [https://perma.cc
/6XKC-ZCEJ]; see also supra note 161. 
323 USASPENDING.GOV, https://www.usaspending.gov/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc
/MKH8-HPY2]. 
324 Based on her examination of FOIA logs and conversations with senior officials, Professor 
Kwoka has recently identified several “highly promising areas in which affirmative disclosure could 
preempt the need for routine commercial FOIA requesting” at agencies such as the EPA, the FDA, 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Margaret B. Kwoka, Inside FOIA, Inc., 126 YALE 
L.J.F. 265, 270 (2016); see also id. at 272 (urging caution before using affirmative disclosure in cases 
“where detailed record-by-record review is required and where a minority of the total records in a 
given category are currently requested under FOIA”). 
325 Under the E-FOIA Amendments of 1996, agencies must make available for public inspection 
records released to any person “which, because of the nature of their subject matter, the agency 
determines have become or are likely to become the subject of subsequent requests for substantially the 
same records.” Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 4, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) 
(2012)). Under the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, agencies must do the same for records “that have 
been requested 3 or more times.” Pub. L. No. 114-185, § 2, 130 Stat. 538, 538 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(2)(D)(ii)(II)). 
326 See We the People, WHITE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov [https://perma.cc/U8F5-
DSXW]. 
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power.327 The “incidents” that trigger these processes of review vary widely, as 
do the processes themselves. There is no reason in principle why such systems 
could not be developed across more policy domains and applied to the regulators 
themselves, as through reporting requirements triggered by credible claims of 
dangerous or improper operations within the agency. 
Continual reassessment and revision. As petitions, incident reports, oversight 
hearings, media exposés, and other sources reveal ways in which an affirmative 
disclosure policy is over- or under-inclusive, the policy itself ought to be 
dynamically reconsidered in light of these revelations. Congress could require 
periodic agency self-evaluations or independent reviews toward this end. An 
entity such as OGIS or the Administrative Conference of the United States, 
for example, could be tasked with collecting criticisms of existing affirmative 
disclosure laws and generating reports and recommendations on how these 
laws might be improved. 
At some point, of course, affirmative disclosure norms may be taken so far 
that they impose stifling costs of their own. It is useful to recall in this regard that 
well before the open data movement burst onto the scene, FOIA already directed 
agencies to post online not only final opinions, orders, and rules but also all 
records “released to any person” and “likely” to be requested multiple times.328 
This is a fairly sweeping directive; change the word “released” to “releasable” and 
it starts to look like the sort of comprehensive publication policy that Congress 
now appears to demand.329 As this observation suggests, advancing access to 
information while moving away from FOIA’s request-driven model may not 
require any elaborate new schemes. All that it would require, at least at the start, 
is a commitment to building on the affirmative disclosure measures we already 
have and enforcing them with more creativity and care. 
CONCLUSION: GETTING OVER, AND BEYOND, FOIA 
There is a standard way to write a law review article about FOIA. The 
author assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that the Act is an indispensable 
achievement the implementation of which has, regrettably, fallen short in 
certain respects: inadequate judicial stewardship, overlong processing times, 
bureaucratic roadblocks, and so forth. The basic structure and value of the Act 
are taken for granted. The criticisms and prescriptions offered are internal to 
FOIA’s request-driven paradigm. 
 
327 See Charles Sabel et al., Regulation Under Uncertainty: The Co-Evolution of Industry and 
Regulation 7-13 (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/
Final%20Uncertainty.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5QP-LEGX]. 
328 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(D) (2012); see supra notes 56–57, 325 and accompanying text. 
329 See supra notes 308–309 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative disclosure 
provisions in the DATA Act of 2014 and the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016). 
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FOIA’s fiftieth anniversary provides an opportune occasion to reassess the 
Act in more holistic terms. This Article has argued that if we step outside of 
the FOIA paradigm—if we denaturalize its approach to disclosure and 
consider the vision of the state that it embodies and reinforces—we will find 
that the problems with the Act run deeper. FOIA does not simply fall short 
of its transparency and accountability aspirations; it systematically skews the 
production of information toward commercial interests and facilitates 
powerful antiregulatory agendas. The inadequacies of FOIA’s original design 
have been exacerbated by external developments, including the decline of the 
traditional news media and the rise of hyper-adversarial watchdog groups on 
the right. Our veneration of FOIA has blinded us to the politics of FOIA.330 
Moreover, the implementation issues that have sucked up so much critical 
attention are both more predictable and less tractable than is generally 
assumed. Processing delays, judicial skepticism, bureaucratic resistance, and 
corporate crowding out of other requesters could be curtailed only at great 
cost, if at all, as they follow from the Act’s radically decentralized structure. 
The most promising path forward, I have suggested, involves displacing 
FOIA requests as the lynchpin of transparency policy and shoring up 
alternative strategies, above all affirmative disclosure frameworks that release 
information in the absence of a request.331 A large-scale affirmative disclosure 
regime seemed technologically infeasible and practically unenforceable in 1966. 
It is neither at this point. While fully implementing such a regime would raise 
significant challenges, the tools to meet them are at hand. Congress has 
established a growing set of affirmative disclosure mandates and administrative 
oversight mechanisms over the past several decades. And the request-driven 
FOIA model might remain in place in a number of supplementary or 
transitional capacities, whether as a platform especially for journalists, for 
disclosures of personal or privacy-sensitive information, or for checking against 
affirmative disclosure’s underutilization. Adopting this suggestion, then, need 
not involve a legal revolution so much as a refocusing of resources, reformist 
energy, and political will. 
Although I have sketched an alternative path, I have hedged on the details 
in part because of my uncertainty about whether FOIA requests ought to be 
 
330 Within certain nonlegal, non-American literatures on transparency, this observation would 
not seem so surprising. See, e.g., Clare Birchall, ‘Data.gov-in-a-box’: Delimiting Transparency, 18 EUR. 
J. SOC. THEORY 185, 196 (2015) (arguing that we “need to politicize data, transparency, and openness 
in general—to ask what role revelation should play in democratic representation”); Calland, supra note 
97, at 84 (arguing that “there needs to be a recognition of [access to information] as fundamentally a 
matter of politics and political economy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
331 I am hardly alone in this conclusion, even if I arrive here by a different route. See supra note 
310 (collecting sources that advocate greater affirmative disclosure); see also Sunstein, supra note 171 
(manuscript at 2-3) (arguing on welfarist grounds that the government should usually disclose information 
about its outputs “even without request”). 
2017] Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act 1157 
phased out wherever feasible or retained in some modified form that reduces 
the “tax” they impose on government agencies and employees. At the end of 
the day, I remain genuinely ambivalent about how far to take this Article’s 
arguments. An appreciation of FOIA’s complex and often unintended 
consequences counsels humility as well as openness to reform. Whatever the 
best solution, however, I hope this Article has established that there is a serious 
problem in need of solving—that FOIA not only does less good than its stature 
would suggest but also is itself a threat to a range of public law values. 
The election of a President believed by many to be a dangerous demagogue 
points up an additional complication. In exploring the dark side of FOIA, this 
Article has called attention to the ways in which the Act can be weaponized to 
obstruct federal agencies (with the crucial caveat that this weapon is largely 
ineffective in the national security realm, as well as inapplicable to the 
President himself). Such uses of FOIA now look more attractive to some. If, in 
a given period, one believes these agencies are likely to do terrible things, then 
it may be rational to accept any number of tradeoffs in the hope of frustrating 
their efforts.332 
I have tried to show why the antityranny case for FOIA is doubtful333—and 
prone to devolve into a broader antistatism—and why, more generally, FOIA 
fails to secure the production of truth or good governance. I have tried to show 
further how a variety of other disclosure devices could be made even more 
effective at rooting out agency abuse. This Article’s critique of FOIA does not 
depend on any especially optimistic view of the executive. But it must be 
conceded that this critique will seem less urgent to those who place a high moral 
value on the obstruction, however indirect and piecemeal, of current 
officeholders. Even if I am right that a transparency strategy based on relentless 
FOIA requests will ultimately redound to the detriment of progressives, 
immediate tactical imperatives may cut in the other direction.334 
 
332 See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text. I take this to be the spirit in which some 
activists declared they would “relentlessly” file and litigate FOIA requests against the incoming Trump 
Administration. Ben Norton, “FOIA Superhero” Launches Campaign to Make Donald Trump’s Administration 
Transparent, SALON (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.salon.com/2016/11/27/foia-superhero-launches-campaign
-to-make-donald-trumps-administration-transparent [https://perma.cc/Z3NT-H2RS]. The prospect of a 
partisan FOIA arms race is raised, more starkly, by reports that “top liberal donors” are considering 
“forming a liberal equivalent to the right’s Judicial Watch, which spent much of the past eight years 
as a thorn in the Obama administration’s side filing legal petitions under the Freedom of Information 
Act.” Anna Palmer & Daniel Lippman, Liberal Groups Steel Themselves to Battle Trump, POLITICO 
(Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/liberal-groups-donald-trump-231383 [https://
perma.cc/6ZPH-BV7R]. 
333 See supra Section III.C. 
334 Other countries, furthermore, might need a different mix of transparency policies. Just as 
Professor Jeremy Waldron’s well-known “case against judicial review” is designed only for societies 
with a strong commitment to the idea of rights and with democratic and judicial institutions in 
reasonably good working order, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 
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Important as they are, these caveats and contingencies do not qualify the 
Article’s basic message. If FOIA’s fiftieth anniversary is to be a meaningful 
event, we will need to set aside FOIA fetishism even as we recognize the Act’s 
accomplishments. The Supreme Court, among many others, has opined that 
the Act amounts to “a structural necessity in a real democracy.”335 Perhaps certain 
freedom of information laws live up to this billing in certain societies. In the 
United States, however, the notion has become increasingly implausible—and 
distracting. The structural question that demands our attention is whether 
FOIA amounts to a long-term impediment to administrative capacity, trust in 
government, and an egalitarian democracy. 
 
YALE L.J. 1346, 1360-66 (2006), the “case against FOIA” offered in this Article does not necessarily 
generalize to other contexts. Transparency policies can have “highly idiographic” impacts, COLIN 
DARCH & PETER G. UNDERWOOD, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD 7 (2010), and the cost–benefit profile of a FOIA-style law may look substantially more 
compelling in a state with weak administrative oversight institutions, a highly concentrated media 
market, or an entrenched culture of political patronage. Cf. Calland, supra note 97, at 84-85 (arguing 
that FOI laws can have “progressive” effects under certain conditions, including robust use by 
“marginalised communities” and coverage of “private as well as publicly held information”). 
335 Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 
